Indiana Law Journal
Volume 61

Issue 4

Article 1

Fall 1986

A History of Injunctions in England Before 1700
David W. Raack
Ohio Northern University

Follow this and additional works at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, and the Legal History Commons

Recommended Citation
Raack, David W. (1986) "A History of Injunctions in England Before 1700," Indiana Law Journal: Vol. 61 :
Iss. 4 , Article 1.
Available at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol61/iss4/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by
the Law School Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer
Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Indiana Law
Journal by an authorized editor of Digital Repository @
Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
rvaughan@indiana.edu.

Indiana
Law
Journal

__

:5
Vol. 61, No.4
CCC~

1985-1986

A History of Injunctions in England Before 1700*
DAviD

W.

RAACK**

INTRODUCTION

The injunction has been called the quintessential equitable remedy.' This
article will examine the history of this equitable remedy before 1700. First,
several of the injunction's possible forerunners, in ancient Roman law and
in the equity administered by the early English common law courts, will be
discussed. The article will then trace the development of injunctions in
England until the end of the 1600's.
The rules of injunctions, like the rules of equity generally, 2 were a product
of the institution of the Court of Chancery, and this account of the evolution
of injunctions will necessarily entail an account of the growth of Chancery
from its origin as an administrative office to its emergence as a judicial
body. The period before 1700 was chosen because the events and conflicts

* I want to express my appreciation to John Lindsey, Law Librarian and Professor of
Law at Temple University School of Law, for his valuable comments and suggestions on this
article. I also want to thank Lawrence Reilly, Reference Law Librarian at Terhple University
School of Law, for translating into English many of the cases used. An earlier draft of this
article was submitted as the author's LL.M. thesis at Temple.
** Assistant Professor of Law, Ohio Northern University, Pettit College of Law; LL.M.,
Temple University School of Law 1985; J.D., University of Missouri-Kansas City School of

Law 1979.
1. "As the characteristic remedies of the courts of common law are the judgment awarding
seisin of land and the judgment for damages, the characteristic remedy of Chancery is injunction." C. REnAn,

THE LAW OF THE LAND: THE EvoLuTION OF OuR LEGAL SYSTEM 275

(1980).
2. See T. PLucKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF Tn COMMON LAW 677-80 (5th ed. 1956).
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of this period had perhaps the largest influence in shaping modern injunctive
rules.
Although some other equitable remedies, such as specific performance,
are quite similar to injunctions, this discussion will be limited to injunctions.
An injunction may be defined as "[a] judicial process operating in personam,
and requiring [the] person to whom it is directed to do or refrain from
doing a particular thing." 3 The focus here will be on in personam judicial
orders in cases where there has not been an agreement or contract between
the parties; cases involving such agreements belong more properly to a history
of contract and specific performance.

I.

FORERUNNERS OF INJUNCTIONS

It does not appear that the term injunction was used to describe a judicial
remedy until after the Chancery became a judicial body, in the later part
of the fourteenth century. But there were several remedies that appeared in
legal history prior to that time which, because they functioned in ways
similar to injunctions, suggest themselves as forerunners or ancestors of
injunctions. These remedies were the Interdict of ancient Roman law, the
writs of the English Kings in the period following the Norman Conquest,
and the writs of the early English common law courts.
A.

Interdict of Roman Law

A number of scholars have noted the similarity between the Praetor's
interdicts of Roman law and injunctions. Interdicts were "certain forms of
words, by which the Praetor (the chief judicial magistrate of Rome) either
commanded or prohibited something to be done; and they were chiefly used
in controversies respecting possession, or quasi possession." ' 4 This definition
indicates a resemblance to injunctions: the commanding or prohibiting something to be done.
Interdicts of the Praetor were of three sorts: prohibitory, forbidding an
act; restitutory, ordering property to be restored to a party; and exhibitory,
commanding a defendant to produce something in court.5 Although interdicts
were of three types, the prohibitory form appears to have been the most
common; one writer has explained that interdicts were frequently used "to
prevent persons being disturbed in the exercise of any just right, or to prohibit

3. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 705 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
4. 2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 866 (5th ed. 1849). Story added
that "it is said to have been called Interdict, because it was originally interposed in the nature
of an interlocutory decree between two parties, contending for possession, until the property
could be tried. But afterwards the appellation was extended to final decretal orders of same
nature." Id.
5. Id.
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any acts being done which would obstruct the free use of the public ways'6
or navigable rivers, or to prevent the cutting down trees, and the like."
And it is in situations like these, where harm is threatened, that injunctions
would come to be used in English equity.
Is there any relationship between the Praetor's interdict and the injunction
of Chancery? A number of scholars have speculated on this question. 7 The
most likely answer is that "[t]he interdict was in point of form very similar
to the injunction of our law, and it is probable that the suggestion for the
latter came from the former."' But it is not certain that this is what happened,
for decisions in the early years of Chancery, when the injunction began to
be used, did not contain reasoned, legal explanations. There is no direct
evidence that the Chancellors were prompted to use injunctions by the
example of Roman law interdicts. There are, however, many points of
similarity between the interdict and the injunction.
B.

Orders (Writs) of the King

The writ of the early English Kings was another device that resembled the
injunction. In the period from the Norman Conquest until about 1258 there
were writs, or more properly, orders from the King, concerning individual
disputes.9 Although called writs, they were not writs in the modern sense,
not standard forms obtained from Chancery to begin an action;10 they were
more in the nature of orders or mandates.
Before examining the way these orders or writs were used, it is helpful
to consider why the King and his officials were involved in resolving private
disputes. There were, during this early period in English legal history (c.
1066 - c. 1258) local courts of the feudal lords which heard legal controversies.
6. 1 G. SPENCE, TiE EQUITABLE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF CHANCERY 670 (1846);
see also W. BUCKLAND & A. McNArR, ROMAN LAW AND COmmoN LAW: A COMPARISON IN
421 (2d ed. 1952).
7. T. SCRUTTON, THE INFLUENCE OF THE ROMAN LAW ON THE LAW OF ENOLAND 162 (1885),
said that injunctions are "comparable to Praetorian Interdicts." See 2 J.STORY, supra note
4, at § 868, where it is said that interdicts "partake very much of the nature of injunctions
in Courts of Equity, and were applied to the same general purposes; that is to say, to restrain
the undue exercise of rights, to prevent threatened wrongs, to restore violated possessions, and
to secure the permanent enjoyment of the rights of property." See also I G. SPENCE, supra
note 6, at 669 (the interdict "afforded a model" for the injunction in Chancery). This relationship was said to be very strong by 4 J.POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE
§ 1337 (3d ed. 1905), who stated that "[t]he remedy of injunction was undoubtedly borrowed
by the chancellors from the 'interdicts' of the Roman law."
8. W. BucKu.Mn & A. MCNAIR, supra note 6, at 420 (citing 1 G. SPENCE, supra note 6,
at 669, 670).
OUTINE

9. M. BIGELOW, HISTORY OF PROCEDURE IN ENGLAND 197-98 (1880).

10. T. PLUCKNETr, supra note 2, at 355. Plucknett described these writs by saying "and
here it must be remembered that the word 'writ', in Latin breve, means nothing more than a
formal letter of a business character; it does no (sic) necessarily imply either a court or court
procedure." Id.

[Vol. 61:539
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But there also was the belief that the Kings were the "fountains of justice.""
An early ordinance, about a century before the Conquest, said this: "And
let no one apply to the king, in any suit, unless he at home may not be
worthy of law, -or cannot obtain law. If the law be too heavy, let him seek
a mitigation of it from the king .... -"2 This concept of the King being the
fountain of justice meant that the King had a duty to provide justice to

suitors if the ordinary avenues of relief proved ineffectual.

3

There was, in

this early period, no Court of Chancery, no court of equity, to provide a
4
remedy where the existing courts could not.'
The Norman sovereigns appear to have still retained to themselves the
ancient Saxon prerogative, or rather duty, of protecting and assisting
the poor, the impotent, and defenceless [sic], who were unable to obtain
redress in the ordinary tribunals. Besides which the king appears to have
exercised ... a prerogative jurisdiction to protect the enjoyment of rights
in cases where 5 the ordinary modes of proceeding would not afford
effectual relief.

One of the ways in which the Kings fulfilled this duty was to issue orders
(termed writs) in specific cases.' 6 It appears that litigants, frustrated by the
regular courts, would appeal to the King for relief. The King could then do

one of two things: command the lord of the manor or some other person
to do "full right" or justice to the plaintiff, 7 or "address his mandate
directly to a recusant defendant, requiring him to do what the plaintiff
11. D. KERLY, AN HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE EQUITABLE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF
CHANCERY 13 (1890).
12. The Secular Ordinance of Edgar, ch. 2 (959-75), reprinted in R. POUND & T. PLUCKNETT, READINGS ON THE HISTORY AND SYSTEM OF THE COMMON LAW 194 (3d ed. 1927). See
also the Statute of Westminster I, 3 Edw. 1, ch. 17 (1275), which stated in part that "the
King, which is Sovereign Lord over all, shall do Right there unto such as will complain."
13. Several legal scholars have noted this royal duty. T. PLUcKNETT, supra note 2, at 681,
said "equity is inseparable from the duty of the king to do justice and his power to exercise
discretion, and ... this duty and power is at least as old as the conquest." Adams, The Origin
of English Equity, 16 COLUM. L. REv. 87, 91 (1916), referred to the King's "duty of furnishing
security and justice to all in the community." See also Holdsworth, The Relation of the Equity
Administered by the Common Law Judges to the Equity Administered by the Chancellor, 26
YALE L.J. 1, 22 (1916) [hereinafter cited as Holdsworth, Relation of Equity]. Holdsworth

mentioned "the theory that the king must do justice-even though he interfered with the strict
rules of law." Id.
14. M. BIGELOW, supra note 9, at 19. Bigelow added that although the Chancellor did not
have an equitable jurisdiction at this time, "[t]he nation, however, possessed a judge in equity
in the king." Id.
15. 1 G. SPENCE, supra note 6, at 107-08.
16. See M. BIGELOW, supra note 9, at 199, where Bigelow described these writs as "the
embodiment of the principle that the king personally was the fountain of justice."
17. Id. at 151. See also T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 2, at 355-56. Plucknett had a different
emphasis than Bigelow, and said that these writs were used to increase the jurisdiction of the
royal courts. The writ would require a sheriff to command the feudal lord to do justice or
explain his actions in the King's Court, with the result of bringing many disputes before the
King's Court.
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prayed, or rather, what the king was pleased to order.' '1 8 These latter writs,
addressed "directly to a recusant defendant," deserve attention as possible
forerunners of injunctions.' 9
One case involving a writ directly from the King arose during the reign
of William the Conqueror (1066-1087) when a dispute developed between
the Abbot of St. Edmund and the Abbot of Peterborough. 2° King William
issued an order commanding the Abbot of Peterborough not to molest the
Abbot of St. Edmund who was carrying away stones for his church. In
another case, c. 1092, the Abbot of Abingdon obtained an order from King
William II, commanding the King's foresters not to molest the Abbot's
lands, wood, and pastures. 2' In a similar suit during the reign of Henry I
(1100-1135), the Abbot Faritius obtained an order commanding the King's
falconer, Ared, and all the King's foresters to allow the Abbot to take away
wood.? King Stephen, in a case in 1148, issued an order analogous to an
injunction. His order, directed to the sheriffs, bailiffs, and townsmen of
Canterbury, prohibited any interference with the men of Canterbury going
to or coming from the mill.?3 These four cases-four instances where royal
orders were issued-all involved orders prohibiting the molestation or interference with the plaintiffs in their exercise of rights. The rights involved
were generally property rights-rights to stones or wood, or rights to use a
mill. In this respect, these cases resemble many injunction cases, where
plaintiffs seek to prevent interference with the exercise of property rights.
These royal orders correspond to injunctions in another respect: they were
in personam orders, addressed directly to the defendants. One legal scholar
has said:
Some of these [orders or writs] were of a kind which in modem times
would be called equitable. The most numerous were what may be termed
writs of protection. These writs are interesting as being the forerunners
of modern writs of injunction, 24and perhaps of the protective process
generally of the early Chancery.

18. M. BIGELOW, supra note 9, at 152.
19. One other form of these writs were those "issued to the king's judges, or to his officers

and bailiffs generally or in particular, commanding them to do, or more commonly to refrain
from doing, and to prohibit others from doing, certain specified things, or to respect certain
specified rights." These writs were orders to officials, not injunction-like commands to parties

in litigation. M. BIGELOW, supra note 9, at 152.
20. Abott of St. Edmund v. Abott of Peterborough (n.d.), reportedin M. BIGELOW,
ANGLO-NoRMANeA: LAW CASES FROM WrLLIAM I. TO RICHARD I.
as M. BiGELow, LAW CASES]; M. BIGELOW, supra note 9, at 192.

PLACrTA

32 (1881) [hereinafter cited

21. Abott of Abingdon v. The King's Foresters (c. 1092), reported in M. BIGELOW, LAW
CASES, supra note 20, at 64; M. BIGELOW, supra note 9, at 192-93.
22. Abbot Faritius v. Ared (c. 1108), reported in M. BIGELOW, LAW CASES, supra note 20,
at 96; M. BIGELOW, supra note 9, at 193.
23. Men of Canterbury (1148), reported in M. BIGELOW, LAW CASES, supra note 20, at
159; M. BIGELOW, supra note 9, at 193.
24. M. BIGELOW, supra note 9, at 192 (emphasis added).
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As noted earlier in the discussion of Roman interdicts, it is, perhaps, not
possible to know with certainty if the Chancellors based injunctions on these
royal orders or writs. But clearly these orders have many points of agreement
with injunctions used in Chancery.

C. Equity in the Early Common Law Courts
The common law courts in England existed long before Chancery became
a court of law (which occurred c. 1380-1400 A.D.). This does not mean that
there was no equity in the law before Chancery; nor does it mean that when
Chancery began administering equitable remedies-such as injunctions-that
these remedies were original creations of the Chancellors. The Chancellors
found the common law courts to be a fertile source of ideas.
The early common law courts (King's Bench, Exchequer, and Common
Pleas) were offshoots of the King's Court. They administered both law and
equity,21 although to express it this way is an anachronism. They did not
see themselves as offering remedies of two different sorts; the distinction
between law and equity was unknown then. 26 The common law courts were
fulfilling the King's duty of doing justice in ways now considered to be both
legal and equitable.
In this early period, there were few judicial precedents and only a handful
of statutes. The central common law courts possessed wide discretionary
powers and could do whatever equity required. 27 Perhaps these courts, in
the centuries following the Conquest, believed themselves able to grant

25. See generally Hazeltine, The Early History of English Equity, in ESSAYS IN LEGAL
261 (P. Vinogradoff ed. 1913). I am greatly indebted to this excellent essay for my
account of equity in the common law courts that follows.
26. See Adams, The Origin of English Equity, 16 COLUM. L. REv. 87 (1916). Adams wrote:
[W]e may confidently assert that Equity and Common Law originated in one and
the same procedure, that during the first two hundred years of their history they
were not distinguished from one another, and that if we now distinguish between
them during that period, we do it artificially, by the application of tests impossible
to contemporaries . . . It is well on in the fourteenth century before we get any
clear distinction between Equity and Common Law ....
Id. at 89; see also Barbour, Some Aspects of Fifteenth-Century Chancery, 31 HARv. L. REv.
834 (1918) [hereinafter cited as Barbour, Fifteenth-Century Chancery]. Barbour said, "In fact
to speak of law and equity is to import into the twelfth and thirteenth centuries a modem
distinction which is absent." Id. at 834.
27. Hazeltine, supra note 25, at 262; see also 1 W. HODSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW 448-49 (A. Goodhart & H. Hanbury eds. 1924) ("both the court of Common Pleas and
the court of King's Bench did apply to cases which came before them ideas and doctrines which
we have come to associate with equity rather than with law"). And see I F. POLLOCK & F.
MArnLAND, TH HIsToRY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE Tim TrmE OF EDWARD I 189-90 (2d ed.
1968), where it is explained that,
our king's court is according to very ancient tradition a court that can do whatever
equity may require ....
In the days of Henry II and Henry III the king's court
wields discretionary powers such as are not at the command of lowlier courts,
and the use of these powers is an exhibition of 'equity.'
HISTORY
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flexible, "equitable"

remedies not only because they were an extension of

the King and could carry out his duty to do justice, but also because they
were outside the ordinary system of justice, just as Chancery was later to
be outside the ordinary common law system.2 Thus, where the local courts
were unable to provide a remedy, the central common law courts furnished
one, even if the case required an equitable remedy. It appears, therefore,
that the history of the these common law courts contains the beginnings of

English equity. In the words of one scholar, "[t]hese courts developed a
rudimentary system of equitable principles and equitable remedies very like,
in some respects, the more fully and elaborately developed system of Chancery in a later age." 29 The following section discusses some of the writs30
by which these equitable remedies were administered in the early common
31
law.
1. Writ of Prohibition
One of the principal writs of the early common law courts was the writ
of prohibition. In its present use it serves as a writ from a superior court
to prevent an inferior court from exercising jurisdiction over matters not
within its cognizance, or from exceeding its jurisdiction in matters of which
it has cognizance.12 The early common law courts used the writ of prohibition
in two ways. The first way, similar to its present use, was to prevent other
courts, especially ecclesiastical courts, from hearing matters not properly
within their jurisdiction, 33 to insure that these other courts did not expand

28. Adams, supra note 26, at 93. Adams wrote:
We must not overlook the fact that at the accession of Henry II the system of
justice which grew into the Common Law was as much outside of, and in violation
of, the ordinary system of justice which prevailed throughout the Anglo-Norman
state, as ever Equity was at any later time in relation to the Common Law system.
Id.
29. Hazeltine, supra note 25, at 262.
30. These writs, as will be seen, are writs more in the modern sense of the term than the
royal orders, or writs, discussed above.
31. See Adams, The Continuityof English Equity, 26 YALE L.J. 550, 554-55 (1917). Adams
described the development and path of equity. The first period he listed as 1066 to c. 1170,
when equity was still part of the King's large sphere of prerogative action, and it was "administered by the Council, great and small." During the second period, from c. 1170 to c.
1300, the royal courts were administering equity by carrying out the King's prerogative. This
was done by the Itinerant Justices and by the central courts. It is this period, during which
equity flourished in the courts of law, which is being discussed in the text above. After this
time, these courts became inflexible and set in their ways, and after c. 1300, their use of equity
diminished.
32. BALLENTINE'S LAW DIcTioNARY 1006, 1381 (3d ed. 1969).

33. Hazeltine, supra note 25, at 277. Hazeltine explained this use of the writ of prohibition
as follows:
In the long struggle of the common law courts with their rivals-in the Middle
Ages, chiefly the ecclesiastical tribunals-the writ of prohibition proved itself a
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their jurisdiction at the expense of the common law courts. The second use
of the writ of prohibition was as an order directly from the common law
court to the defendant. It is this second use that resembles an injunction.
The common law courts used the writ of prohibition as an order directly
addressed to the defendant, by fashioning their decree in one of several
forms. The first form such a decree took was an order to the defendant to
refrain from committing some wrongful act. For example, in a case in 1219,
the court entered a writ of prohibition to prevent guardians of property
from making waste of the woods.3 4 In another case, a party with a reversionary interest in property sued the present tenant for waste. The court,
by a writ of prohibition, ordered that the tenant pay damages for the waste
committed and that she be prohibited from committing further waste;3 5 the
court thus combined legal (damages) and equitable (writ of prohibition)
remedies. In another case, the court entered a writ of prohibition specifying
that the defendant refrain not only from active waste-the doing of voluntary
acts that constitute waste-but also from passive waste-here, permitting a
36
fish pond and mill to dry up.
The second form the writ of prohibition took was an order that defendant
take affirmative steps to remove an interference with another's property.
For example, in one case the defendant had built a dike that cut off the
plaintiff's animals from access to pasture land. The court decreed, by writ
of prohibition, that the defendant remove the dike. 3" It was ordered in
another case that the defendant's market, which was being held in violation
of its own charter and which constituted a nuisance to plaintiff's market,
be closed down.38 These cases illustrate that the writ of prohibition was not
limited to prohibiting actions; it could also function to require defendants
to perform remedial actions.

weapon of wonderful power. It was a writ which could be and was directed not
only against parties, but also against tribunals. In cases involving subject matter
claimed by the common law courts as falling within their own exclusive jurisdiction,
not only were parties restrained by prohibition from suing in ecclesiastical courts,
but those courts were themselves restrained by prohibition from entering such
proceedings. It was thus largely by this writ that the courts of common law
preserved and extended their jurisdiction, keeping other tribunals to their own
peculiar province, and that they protected parties in their common law rights as
opposed to rights good at ecclesiastical law.
Id.
34. 2 H. BRACTON, BRACTON's NoT-Booc, pl. 27 (1219) (F. Maitland ed. 1887) [hereinafter
cited as BAcToN's NoTE-BooK]; see also id., pl. 607 (1231) (where the court used a writ of
prohibition to restrain the defendant from making further waste of the property).
35. 2 BA CTON's NOTE-BOoK, supra note 34, pl. 540 (1231).
36. 3 BRACTON's NOTE-BooK, supra note 34, pl. 1617 (1223); Hazeltine, supra note 25, at
272.
37. 3 BRACTON'S NOTE-BOoK, supra note 34, pl. 1253 (1238).
38. 3 BRACTON's NoTE-BOOK, supra note 34, pl. 1162 (1235).
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A third form of the writ of prohibition was a command requiring defendants to go beyond removing interferences, requiring them to restore or replace
property that had been damaged or lost. One such case occurred when a
guardian of property gave two trees and two houses to a dowress who
removed them from the property. The court ordered, by writ of prohibition,
that the guardian build two houses of the same value as those he had given
away.3 9 In another case, a guardian of an estate who had committed waste
was ordered to restore a kitchen that had burned and to repair two buildings
that had collapsed-damage that was due to her lack of maintenance. She
was also ordered to repair all the other buildings on the property and to
refrain from further waste. 4° These two cases demonstrate that courts used
the writ of prohibition to require substantial affirmative, restorative acts,
not simply to prohibit threatened harm.
The writ of prohibition was, in procedural terms, an order from the early
common law courts. It was issued at the conclusion of an action or proceeding, such as an action on the writ of waste. 41 The writ of prohibition
was an in personam order; it was frequently laid directly upon the defendant
by the court. 42 The writ could be used both as a temporary measure-such
as an order to refrain from acting while a legal action was pending-or as
a permanent decree-an order, for example, to permanently close the defendant's market. 43 These features of the writ of prohibition-its use as an order
concluding the proceedings, its in personam character, and its use as an
interlocutory or permanent decree-are also features of injunctions. Another
similarity was that one of the possible punishments for violation of the writ
of prohibition was imprisonment of the disobedient party, 44 just as it is a
punishment for contempt for one who ignores an injunction. One significant
difference between prohibition and injunctions was that prohibition could
be addressed directly to other courts to prevent them from acting; injunctions
could not.
The majority of the early writ of prohibition cases in the common law
courts concerned wrongs to property or property rights-frequently waste
39. The defendant was also required to find pledges to guarantee that he would not remove
trees or commit further waste and that he would build the two houses. See 3 BRACTON'S NorEBooi, supra note 34, pl. 1075 (1225); Hazeltine, supra note 25, at 273.
40. 3 BRACTON'S NoTE-BOOK, supra note 34, pl. 1165 (1235); Hazeltine, supra note 25, at
273.
41. Hazeltine, supra note 25, at 283.
42. Id. Hazeltine noted that the writ of prohibition was also issued in some cases as an
order to the sheriff to make sure, for example, that the defendant would commit no further
waste. But Hazeltine did not believe that this altered the essentially in personam nature of the
writ of prohibition.
43. Id. at 282-83.
44. Id. at 283. Concerning this writ, Hazeltine wrote that, "disobedience resulted in serious
consequences. In some cases breach of the prohibition gave rise to self-help on the part of the
aggrieved person, forceful measures by the sheriff, and even imprisonment of the disobedient
party." Id.
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or nuisance. 45 The writ of prohibition operated, as we have seen, in a negative
fashion, prohibiting certain acts, such as active or passive waste. But it was
also used to require, in a positive way, defendants to take affirmative steps,
such as removing interferences to the property rights of others, or repairing
and restoring property that had been damaged or destroyed. The flexibility
of the writ of prohibition is yet another feature that it had in common with
injunctions.
The case of Prior of Coventry v. William Grauntpie" illustrates this
similarity between injunctions and prohibitions. The plaintiff claimed that
he had an exclusive right to hold a market in the town on Fridays, and that
the defendants had violated this right by buying and selling outside his
market, at another location. The plaintiff prevailed. The court, by a writ
of prohibition, ordered the defendants not to expose their wares for sale in
the town on Fridays anywhere other than at the plaintiff's market.47 Maitland, commenting on this order, said, "If this is not an 'injunction' and a
'perpetual injunction,' we hardly know what to call it.'' 4 He therefore

concluded that, "[w]e can hardly say that the idea of an injunction was
foreign to the common law." 49 Maitland is not the only scholar to have
observed the parallel between early writs of prohibition and injunctions.
Holdsworth wrote:
[I]n the case of waste the court possessed another weapon in the writ
of prohibition, which at this period, was so developed that it did work
analogous to that done both by the perpetual and the interlocutory
injunction of our modern law.... No doubt these writs of prohibition

were as often as not addressed to the sheriff, because he was the executive
officer of the court. But they could also be addressed to the parties,

and, in such cases, it is clear that they present an analogy to the equitable
injunction.0

The number and reputation of the legal scholars who have pointed out the
correspondence between this writ and the injunction leads to the conclusion
that the writ of prohibition of the early common law courts was indeed one
of the chief forerunners of the injunction."
45. 2 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 27, at 248.
46. Y.B. 2 Edw. 2, pl. 141 (1308-1309), reprinted in 19 SELDEN Socry 71 (F. Maitland
ed. 1904).
47. Id. at xiii.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 74 n.l.
50. 2 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 27, at 248-49 (emphasis added).
51. See Hazeltine, supra note 25, at 279 ("[Tlhe courts of the common law were in this
early period exercising a jurisdiction in personam by prohibition which anticipated Chancery
jurisdiction in personam by injunction."); see also T. PLUCKNETr, supra note 2, at 678 ("Then,
too, there were occasions upon which the common law would issue what is really an injunction
under the name of a writ of prohibition ... ."); H. POTTER, AN HisTolucAL INTRODUCTION
TO ENGLISH LAW AND ITS INsTTUTIONs 552 (2d ed. 1943) ("Like specific performance this
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2. Writ of Estrepment
In this period before the emergence of the Court of Chancery, the common
law courts had another writ of an equitable nature-the writ of estrepment.
This writ could be obtained in a real property action after judgment but
before execution, to prevent the defendant (who had lost the suit but was
still in possession of the property) from committing waste before the judgment was executed and he was removed. 52 The purpose of the writ was to
prevent waste before it occurred.53
At common law, the writ of estrepment was available only after a judgment
had been obtained. In order to expand the writ of estrepment's role, the
Statute of Gloucester 4 established a new, statutory writ of estrepment that
was available at any time during litigation if the plaintiff feared that the
possessor of the property would commit waste.15 This broadened scope
obviously made estrepment a more desirable remedy. One of the possible
penalties for breach of a writ of estrepment was imprisonment.5 6
This writ had several characteristics in common with later injunctions: it
was an in personam order, it commanded the defendant not to do certain
actions, and it entailed the possibility of imprisonment for disobedience.
One writer has suggested that the writ of estrepment served as a model for
the injunction; 7 another has described its similarity to the interlocutory

remedy [the injunction], which is looked upon as peculiarly equitable, had a forerunner in the
Common Law in the writ of prohibition."); 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MTrLAND, supra note 27, at
595-96:
Nor can we say that what is in substance an 'injunction' was as yet unknown.
The 'prohibition' which forbids a man to continue his suit in ecclesiastical court
on pain of going to prison is not unlike that weapon [the injunction] which the
courts of common law will someday see turned against them by the hand of the
chancellor.
52. See 2 W. HoLnswORrH, supra note 27, at 248-49; Hazeltine, supra note 25, at 275.
53. See 2 J. STORY, supra note 4, at 266; 2 E. CoKE, INsm'ur
s 328 (1628 & photo. reprint
1979).
54. Statute of Gloucester, 6 Edw. 1, ch. 13 (1278); see also Hazeltine, supra note 25, at
276.
Several centuries later (c. 1594), when the Court of Chancery had developed injunctions
and was using them, the common law courts attempted to enlarge the preventive relief they
could offer by extending the writ of estrepment beyond its traditional bounds. But this attempt
was foiled by Lord Keeper Egerton (who later became Chancellor Ellesmere) by his refusal to
allow such writs to issue (Chancery had the task of issuing common law writs) except according
to their traditional bounds-in real actions to prevent waste pending suit or after judgment.
D. KERLY, supra note 11, at 150.
55. 1 A. FrrzHERBERT, THE Naw NATURA BRaJvnm 60 (9th ed. 1794), mentioned these two
occasions for the use of the writ of estrepment-during the pendency of a real action, and
after judgment but before execution.
56. Hazeltine, supra note 25, at 276. See also 2 E. COKE, INsnrruEs 329 (1628 & photo.
reprintV979), who noted that upon a writ of estrepment the sheriff could imprison those who
threatened to do waste, in order to prevent it from occurring.
57. W. AsHBuRNER, AsHBURNER'S PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY 360 n.1 (D. Browne ed. 2d ed.
1933).
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injunction .5 a But it appears that this writ was only available in real property
actions, and, before the Statute of Gloucester, it was only available after
judgment and before execution. It did not possess the flexibility of the writ
of prohibition: it could not be used to order defendants to take affirmative
steps to restore or replace damaged property. In these respects it differed
59
significantly from later Chancery injunctions.
This discussion of the common law writs concludes this survey of the
forerunners of injunctions. Roman interdicts, early royal orders or writs,
and the common law writs mentioned above all partook, to a greater or
lesser degree, of some of the features that were later to be found in Chancery's injunctions.

II.

CHANCERY AND ITS DEVELOPMENT INTO A COURT

A.

Office of the Chancellor

In order to properly understand the growth and development of injunctions, it is beneficial to briefly examine Chancery's emergence as a judicial
body.60
Chancery did not become an adjudicatory body until about 1380-1400; it
existed before then but did not function as a court. 6' The office of Chancellor
originated in the Roman Empire, where it signified a chief scribe and secretary who supervised the other officers of the Emperor. Later in history,
Chancellors existed in the Roman church and in modem European kingdoms,
where they usually would oversee public documents and keep the King's
seal.

62

The Chancellor in England was at first an ecclesiastic with secretarial
duties.6 3 He issued the common law writs, and kept the Great Seal to stamp

58. "How like unto the interlocutory injunction was the old common law writ of estrepment!
In its form it was an interlocutory order in personam and in its object it was a remedy of
preventive justice." Hazeltine, supra note 25, at 276-77.
59. The Common Law writs quia timet have also been compared to the injunction. See
generally Hazeltine, supra note 25, at 285. These were writs brought by a suitor when "he
fears" (quia timet) an injury to his property or rights. They were generally used to prevent
wrongs before they occurred, and not to give redress after the injury had been done. See 1 E.
COKE, CoKE UPON LrrnETON § 100a (Philadelphia 1853), for a more detailed description of
these writs.
60. See generally J. PARKEs, A HISTORY OF TmE CouRT OF CHANCERY (1828); D. KERLY,
supra note 11.
61. See 1 F. POLLOCK & F. MArrLAND, supra note 27, at 193 ("[E]ven in Edward I's reign
[1272-1307] it [Chancery] is not in our view a court of justice; it does not hear and determine
causes. It was a great secretarial bureau, a home office, a foreign office and ministry of
justice.").
62. J. STORY, supra note 4, at § 40.
63. The name "Chancellor" is said to come from cancelli or the lattice-like screen behind
which the Chancellor and his clerks worked. I W. HoLDswoRTH, supra note 27, at 37.
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on important documents copied by his clerks. He was an important
member
4
of the Council and often the King's principal political advisor.
The Chancellor and his clerks at first had considerable latitude in designing
and issuing to suitors common law writs that fit the circumstances of individual cases. 65 This power to issue new writs gave Chancellors significant
control over the rights the royal courts recognized. 66 But in the latter part
of the thirteenth century, this power was curtailed by the common law judges
who successfully asserted that they, not Chancery, had the power to decide
whether a new writ issued by Chancery was valid.67 The rule developed that
new writs could only be made by Parliament, not by Chancery, 6 thus
diminishing the Chancellor's power. 69 During the later part of the thirteenth
century and most of the fourteenth century, the Chancellor remained an
0
official of the Crown but not a judge of equity2

B. Decay of Equity in the Common Law Courts
Near the end of the thirteenth century the equity in the common law
courts began to decline. These courts were becoming rigid, technical, and
overly formal;7 1 they focused more often on the strict letter of the law, less
often on equitable considerations.7 2 This increasing rigidity was gradual: in
Edward I's reign (1272-1307), the common law courts were undecided over
the competing concepts of applying the law strictly or tempering their decision

64. T. PLUCKNEIT, supra note 2, at 164.
65. C. REnmAt, supra note 1, at 274.

66. 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 27, at 398.
67. T. PLUCKNETr, supra note 2, at 164.
68. It is said that this was due to the jealousy of Parliament, which realized that the power
to make new writs was the power to make new law. Barbour, Fifteenth-Century Chancery,
supra note 26, at 834.
69. This power declined despite the Statute of Westminster II, 13 Edw. I, ch. 24 (1285),
which said:
And whensoever from henceforth it shall fortune in the Chancery, that in one
Case a Writ is found, and in like case falling under like Law, and requiring like
Remedy, is found none, the Clerks of the Chancery shall agree in making the
Writ; or adjourn the Plaintiffs until the next Parliament .... by Consent of Men
learned in the Law, a Writ shall be made, lest it might happen after that the
Court should long time fail to minister Justice unto Complainants.
This statute was interpreted to allow Chancery only to extend writs to cases that were very
similar to cases covered by existing writs, and did not restore the latitude and flexibility in
framing writs that Chancery formerly possessed.
70. In addition to the duties already described, the Chancellor had one other: to supervise
the exercise of the powers connected with the King's feudal rights. (This became known as the
"common law" or "Latin" side of Chancery: "common law" as opposed to equity, and
"Latin" because its proceedings were in Latin while equitable proceedings were in English.)
These rights included such things as the King's interest in property when a tenant-in-chief died,
and the King's power to grant lands or offices. See T. PLucKNETT, supra note 2, at 164-65.
71. See De Funiak, Origin and Nature of Equity, 23 Tut. L. Ray. 54 (1948).
72. T. PLUCKNTE, supra note 2, at 681.
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to do equity in the particular case;73 even in the reigns of Edward 11 (13071326) and Edward III (1326-1377), traces of the earlier equity lingered in
the common law courts. 74
There were several factors that contributed to this tendency toward technicality. One, which has been noted above, was that Chancery was no longer
permitted to create new common law writs; the forms of action could not
easily expand. Thus a fertile source of flexibility in the common law courts
disappeared. A second factor was that the common law judges, who had
formerly been closely associated with the Crown and therefore more disposed

to do equity on behalf of the King, were becoming more independent of
the Crown and therefore more inclined to apply rigid legal rules.7 The use

of equity also declined because judges were now more often drawn from
the ranks of lawyers than of clerics; they lacked the canon law influence
that disposed their predecessors toward equitable precepts. 76 A number of
factors, then, were causing the common law to become more certain and

settled, but less equitable.
C.

Petitions to King, Council, and Chancellor

When the common law courts no longer were flexible and equitable in
administering justice, suitors who were unable to obtain relief addressed
petitions to the King and the Council. 77 The Council heard them, but it also
had many political and administrative duties, and these petitions were be-

coming numerous and burdensome. The Council decided to give the responsibility for them to the Chancellor, since he was already the head of a
department that had some judicial functions. 7 s The petitions were forwarded
to the Chancellor, sometimes including a brief instruction. 79 As time went

73. 2 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 27, at 335.
74. Id.
75. 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 27, at 447-48.
76. See Barbour, Fifteenth-Century Chancery, supra note 26, at 834-35; 2 W. HOLDSWORTH,
supra note 27, at 345. Holdsworth said of the judges at this time, "[t]hey ceased to care so
much for those larger principles which, in the thirteenth century, had made for rapid development." See also J. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 87 (2d ed. 1979)
where the author commented that "the judges preferred to suffer mischiefs to individuals than
to make exceptions to clear rules ....
"
77. "Litigants, if they wanted equity, were driven to a tribunal the procedure of which had
remained free from the technical rules which governed the procedure of the common law courts;
and so cases which called for equity went to the Council and later to the Chancery." I W.
HOLDSWORTH, supra note 27, at 449. For a discussion of these petitions and how they ended
upon in Chancery, see T. PLUCINETT, supra note 2, at 178-81.
78. 1 W. HoLDswoRTH, supra note 27, at 339-404.
79. "The Chancellor, therefore, commanded the machinery which sooner or later would
have to be set in motion in order to give redress to petitioners, and so nothing could be simpler
than for the Council to transmit petitions addressed to it to the Chancellor, sometimes (but
not always) endorsing them with a brief instruction what to do." T. PLUCKNETT, supra note
2, at 180-81.
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on, the Council began sending these petitions more frequently to the Chan-

cellor;80 by 1400, suitors began to address their petitions directly to him. 81
In handling these petitions, the Chancellor considered himself empowered
with a certain amount of discretion and equity. Additionally, he began to
operate Chancery with some of the characteristics of a court, so that facts
stated in the petitions could be sifted and persons against whom the complaints were made could have an opportunity to present a defense. 82 This

was a gradual process by which Chancery evolved from a purely administrative institution into one that was also judicial. It is difficult to set an
exact date, but it is fairly certain that between 1380 and the early part of

the following century, Chancery was hearing petitions or cases as a court. 3
At first the Chancellor did not sit as the sole judge in Chancery; frequently
members of the Council or common law judges sat with him. As the fifteenth
century progressed, however, the Chancellor increasingly delivered decrees
on his own in Chancery cases.8
III.

FOURTEENTH AND FIFTEENTH CENTURY

DEVELOPMENT OF CHANCERY AND INJUNCTIONS

The proceedings and decisions of early Chancery are shrouded in some
obscurity. In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, there were no published
reports of Chancery cases.8 5 Even today, only a small proportion of these
cases have been published, mostly by modern scholars relying on early
Chancery records.8 6 Of those that have been published, there are drawbacks

80. S. MiLsoM, HisToRIcAL

FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW

82 (2d ed. 1981).

81. J. BAKER, supra note 76, at 87.

82. 1 W.

HOLDSWORTH,

supra note 27, at 403.

83. There is no unanimity of scholarly opinion on the precise date Chancery began to
operate as a judicial body. See Baildon, Introduction to SELECT CASES iN CHANCERY A.D. 1364
TO 1471 xix (Selden Society Vol. 10) (W. Baildon ed. 1896) [hereinafter cited as Baildon] ("[i]t
seems clear that the Chancellor had and exercised judicial functions of his own as early as the
reign of Richard II [1377-1399] if not Edward III [1326-1377]"); see also 3 W. BLACKSTONE,
COMmENTARi~.s * 51 (separate jurisdiction of Chancery as a court of equity began to be
established about the end of the reign of Edward III); I G. SPENCE, -supranote 6, at 345 ("By
circa 1394, the Court of Chancery was a distinct and permanent court, having its own procedures."); O.W. HoLms, Early English Equity, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 1 (1920)
("At the end of the reign of Henry V [c. 1413] the Court of Chancery was one of the established
courts of the realm.").
84. Baildon, Introduction, supra note 83, at xvi-xxi.
85. In this early period, the Chancellors did not write opinions. The cases that have been
unearthed and published frequently have no more than a very brief description of the facts
and the prayer for relief.
86. Barbour, Fifteenth-Century Chancery, supra note 26, at 840, explained that the actual
proceedings of Chancery for this early period are preserved in documents in bundles in the
Public Records Office. Barbour estimated (in 1918) that there were three hundred thousand
proceedings contained in these enormous bundles, covering c. 1377 to c. 1547, and that fewer
than 1% had been published. Id. at 841.
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to their usefulness: many consist of bills or petitions in which the remedy
sought was not specifically named, 7 and most of the cases do not include
judgments; there is no indication of the Chancellor's rulings, making it
difficult to know when injunctions were first ordered. 8 One can only surmise
that if a large number of petitions asked for a specific form of relief, it
was probably available. 9
A.

The Growth of Chancery

There were several noteworthy attributes of the Court of Chancery in the
period from its inception to the close of the fifteenth century. First, the
equity it dispensed was extremely flexible, not fettered by definite rules or
bound by precedent.9 The decisions have been described as. desultory and
uncertain, rendered according to the personal predilections of the Chancellor; 91 it took time for principles and precedents to become part of
Chancery.
Second, Chancery did not have many cases when it first began to operate
as a court; its caseload was small before 1417,92 but then began to grow
rapidly. Between 1420 and 1450, Chancery's business increased dramatically. 9a By 1450, Chancery's popularity among litigants made it the fourth
major court at Westminster.
This growth was due to the fact that Chancery met a conspicuous need. The
common law courts, during this period, had many shortcomings: they were, for
instance, slow, overly technical, and subject to abuse by powerful litigants.
They also refused to admit the testimony of interested parties or voluntary
witnesses, and were unable to compel discovery. 94 In addition, these courts
could not grant specific relief, nor could they prevent a threatened wrong. 95

87. Sometimes the remedy sought was described in very general terms, as the petitioner
evidently did not know the appropriate remedy to request; the remedy was often left up to the
Chancellor's good judgment. Baildon, Introduction, supra note 83, at xv.
88. See id. at xxix n.1 (only about 9% of the cases have final decrees).
89. Id.
90. F. MAITLAND, THE CoNsTrrUIoNAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 225 (H. Fisher ed. 1920). See
also D. KRLY, supra note 11, at 2, who characterized these Chancery decisions as more in
the nature of judicial awards than judicial decisions based on precedent.
91. 1 W. HOLDSWORTa, supra note 27, at 454 (citing 3 W. BLAcKSro rE, Co
rNTAMEFs
* 53).

92. Avery, The History of the Equitable Jurisdictionof Chancery Before 1460, 42 BULL.
INST. OF HisT. REs. 129, 129-31 (1969).
93. There were four times as many petitions filed per year in 1450 as there were in 1420.
Id. at 130-32.
94. T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 2, at 689.
95. 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 27, at 458. The common law courts did not have

injunctive powers. It appears that, when these courts became more rigid and technical, they
ceased using the writ of prohibition as an equitable remedy.
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Chancery's procedures allowed it to overcome many of these defects, 96 and
therefore made it attractive to many suitors.
There were also gaps in the substance of the common law, which Chancery
endeavored to fill. For example, the common law courts did not deal with
trusts or uses, nor did they grant relief based on fraud, accident, or mistake;
Chancery dealt with these subjects and others neglected by the common
law. 97 Thus Chancery thrived by supplying remedies where the substance or
procedure of the common law was deficient. 9
B.

Fourteenth and Fifteenth Century Injunction Cases

Injunctions appeared in Chancery as early as the 1390's. Injunction cases
in Chancery's early period (from the 1390's to about 1500) were quite diverse,
involving such disparate areas of law as real property, personal property,
tort, and Contract. But the single thread running through all of them was
(as alluded to above) that Chancery cases generally reflected some defect in
the common law system, and it is illuminating to examine injunction cases
in light of the shortcomings in the common law that they attempted to
rectify.
For example, there were cases where the common law simply had no
appropriate remedy. There were other cases where the common law, while
having a remedy available in the type of case, was unable to effectuate it
due to some special circumstances in the case. 99 There also were cases where
the common law procedures were themselves being misused.1°° In all of these
situations, litigants sought injunctions from Chancery.
An example of a dispute where the common law was unable to grant
relief due to some special circumstances was the case of Edmund Faunceys
v. James de Clifford and Hugh de Byslee,' 0 1 where the defendants prevented
the owner of a piece of land, or anyone else, from entering and farming it.
The plaintiff, the owner, asked the Chancellor to order the defendants to
cease their interference. It appears that the only reason this case was in
96. Chancery was, at this period, less technical and more efficient. Barbour, FifteenthCentury Chancery, supra note 26, at 854. It was also less expensive and less subject to abuse
by powerful parties. By its subpoena, Chancery could compel the defendant to appear, where
he would be questioned under oath. And, as we will see, Chancery granted "injunctions against
a variety of wrongful acts." T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 2, at 689.
97. 5 W. HoLDswoRTH, supra note 27, at 292. Holdsworth listed other areas where equity
supplemented the common law: forgery, relief against penalties, contract, agency, partnership,
suretyship, accounting, and administration of assets. Id.
98. T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 2, at 688-89.
99. See Avery, supra note 92, at 132-33.
100. One way the common law procedure was misused was by prosecuting a suit that was
inequitable or "against conscience." See H. POTTER, supra note 51, at 552, where the author
says that by the middle of the fifteenth century the Chancellor began issuing injunctions to
halt such suits.
101. Baildon, supra note 83, at 68-69, pl. 70 (c. 1402).
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Chancery was that the violence and power of the defendants thwarted the
ordinary common law remedies. 0 2
During this period, there were a number of cases relating to recovery of
personal property that were brought to the Chancery because, for one reason
or another, the normal common law action of detinue was unavailable. In
the case of Thomas Bond v. John Nicolle,03 Bond claimed that his inheritance-certain goods and chattels-was placed in the hands of defendants
as trustees, but they refused to deliver it to him. Detinue was unavailable
here because the plaintiff lacked documentary evidence;104 he was forced to
request that the Chancellor order the property turned over to him. Similarly,
detinue was ineffective in John Harleston v. John Caltoft.0 5 Plaintiff had
left certain valuables and papers with his mother when he went on a trip.
While he was gone, she died. Defendant, his step-father, took control of
the valuables and papers, refusing to return them to plaintiff. The plaintiff
applied to the Chancellor for relief; a common law action of detinue would
have been unsuccessful, as there was no privity-no dealings or agreementbetween the parties.'°0 In these cases, 0 7 the ordinary remedies of the common
law were futile, and thus suitors resorted to Chancery, requesting an injunction to obtain recovery of the property.
Injunctions were also sought in cases where the common law simply
furnished no appropriate remedy. There is a report of a case that occurred
in the reign of Richard 11 (1377-1399) in which the Chancellor enjoined the
defendant from committing waste.108 The plaintiff, who had a remainder
interest in the land, could not have sued the tenant at common law for
waste; instead he obtained an injunction from Chancery. This was not an
unusual situation, but common law had no remedy available. The Chancellor,
whose powers were flexible and equitable, was free to grant one. There also
were more unusual situations where litigants sought injunctions, as in John

102. Id. at 69 n.1.
103. Id. at 100, pl. 104 (c. 1410-1412).
104. Id. at 101 n.l. For a similar case, see Martin, Some Chancery Proceedings of the
Fifteenth Century, 59 ARCHAELOGIA 1, 16-17 (1904), for the case of John Besynbe v. Dame
Margaret Welughbe (Martin provides no dates for the cases in his article beyond the fact that
they take place in the 15th century). Plaintiff and his wife Isabell alleged that defendant,
Isabell's mother, was executrix of the estate of Isabell's father, and that she refused to deliver
Isabell's inheritance. They sought an order from the Chancellor commanding her to do so.
105. Baildon, supra note 83, at 113-14, pl. 116 (c. 1413-1417).
106. Id. at 114 n.3.
107. See also the 15th century Chancery case, Robert Draycote v. William Bayly, discussed
in Martin, supra note 104, at 17. Plaintiff claimed that divers of his deeds and evidence of
property were in the hands of defendant, who refused to return them. Since plaintiff did not
know precisely how many of these documents existed, he could not recover at common law,
and thus went to Chancery. For other, similar cases, see Barbour, The History of Contract in
Early English Equity, in 4 OXFORD STUDIES IN SOCA.L AND LEGAL HIsToRY 111-12 (P. Vinogradoff ed. 1914).
108. 1 G. SPENCE, supra note 6, at 671.
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Craven and Simon Irby v. Treasurerof Calais.'°9The plaintiffs had captured
prisoners at the battle of Agincourt, but William Buketon wrongfully took
and ransomed them, without paying any of the ransom to plaintiffs. The
plaintiffs then learned that part of the ransom money was held by the
Treasurer of Calais' wife. They sought an order from the Chancellor to the
defendant "firmly charging and enjoining that the said sum" 0 be kept until
a trial at law could be held to determine if it belonged to plaintiffs. Plaintiffs
were seeking an interlocutory injunction that the property be preserved until
trial-a remedy which did not exist in the common law."'
Another case in which the lack of suitable relief at law forced the plaintiff
2
to resort to Chancery was Margaret Appilgarth v. Thomas Sergeantson."
Defendant told the plaintiff that he desired to marry her, and asked her for
a sum of gold and currency for wedding costs and business investments (to
make him a more profitable husband). She gave him the gold and currency
without demanding a formal contract of marriage; he then married another,
and refused to return the gold and currency. Plaintiff sought an order from
the Chancellor to compel him to do so. Here again, as in the two cases
above, an injunction was requested because there was no common law form
of relief." 3
There were also cases where the common law procedures were being
misused. For example, in Campyn Pynell v. Richard Underwood 4 the plaintiff, a foreign merchant from Lombardy, alleged that the defendant had
filed numerous suits against the plaintiff, each with the same allegationsthat the plaintiff had taken defendant's wife and goods. In each case,
defendant had been nonsuited, but plaintiff had been put to considerable
cost and expense for defense. Defendant had again filed a suit at law
repeating the same grounds. Plaintiff, therefore, sought an order from Chancery that defendant cease harassing plaintiff with suits at law. This is an
early (1396) example of a case where the Chancellor was asked to enjoin a

109. Baildon, supra note 83, at 110, pl. 112 (c. 1415-1417).
110. Id.
111.- It is interesting to note that this injunction was sought against seemingly innocent third
parties who had done nothing wrong but who possessed property claimed by plaintiffs. Unfortunately, we do not have a record of the Chancellor's decision to learn whether an injunction
was issued.
112. Margaret Appilgarth v. Thomas Sergeantson (c. 1439), reported in T. PLUCKNETr &
R. PouND, supra note 12, at 196.
113. Cf. Baildon, supra note 83, at 80, pl. 86. Baildon discusses the case of Hugh Loterell
v. John Hayme and John Clerke (c. 1401-1403), where defendant was slandering plaintiff (and
Chancery) by saying that plaintiff improperly received letters patent from Chancery, instead
of from the King, to entitle him to the Office and ward of a forest. There was no remedy at
law to compel the defendant to cease the slander, so the plaintiff sought an injunction from
Chancery.
114. Id. at 20-21, pl. 18 (c. 1396).
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party's use of the legal procedures. ' 5 A similar case was the fifteenth century
Chancery case Matthew Petit v. Robert Gybson,"16 where plaintiff, another
foreign merchant, had helped defendant's wife (his wife's cousin) to obtain
food and medical attention. Defendant then sued him in trespass, alleging
that he had taken away, by force of arms, defendant's wife and goods.
Plaintiff sought relief in Chancery, stating that becasue he was a foreign
merchant and since defendant had procured prejudiced jurors, he could not
receive justice at law. Plaintiff was obviously seeking an injunction to stop
defendant from proceeding with his suit at law.
These injunction cases in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries involved
a wide variety of matters; they were not confined solely to real property.
This wide variety was due to the fact that the injunction was not a substantive
rule of law but a remedy that was often resorted to when the ordinary legal
processes of the common law left a suitor unsatisfied.
C.

Response of Judges and Parliament to Injunctions

Before examining the response of the common law judges and Parliament
to Chancery's injunctions, it is helpful to gauge their reaction to the new
court, to Chancery itself. The initial reaction of the common law judges to
Chancery was one of some resentment." 7 They disliked competition, especially from a court that disregarded the traditional rules of law and procedure. But soon the judges cooperated with Chancery, at least to the extent
of assisting the Chancellor in deciding some cases." 8 They did not seem to
bear Chancery strong animosity; they even advised suitors with equitable
9
claims to seek relief from the Chancellor."
This cordial relationship appeared to change as time went on. Cases such
as Russell's Case'20 reflected latent hostility between common law and Chancery. In Russell's Case, the defendant had committed a trespass of the
plaintiff's goods, with damages set at twenty pounds. Before judgment was
entered, the defendant obtained an injunction from Chancery that prohibited
the plaintiff from proceeding to judgment. After some time had passed, one

115. The remedy actually sought here, though not in so many words, is an injunction
to restrain the vexatious proceedings at common law. From the fact that no
particulars are given as to the precise nature of the remedy asked for, it may
perhaps be argued that this part of the jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery was
at an inchoate stage. The practice [granting injunctions to restrain suits at law]
was well recognised by the time of Henry VI [1422].
Id. at 21 n.3.
116. Martin, supra note 104, at 9-10 (n.d.).
117. T. PLrucrTT, supra note 2, at 187.
118. Id. at 188.

119. 2 W.

HOLDSWORTH,

supra note 27, at 345.

120. Y.B. 22 Edw. 4, pl. 37 (K.B. 1482), reported in T. PLUCKN=rr & R. POUND, supra note
12, at 197-98.
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of the judges in King's Bench asked the plaintiff's attorney if his client
wished to pray for a judgment. The attorney responded that he did, unless
he would be punished for disobeying the Chancellor's injunction. 2 1 Judge
Hussey recommended that he take a judgment; if the Chancellor imprisoned
him, the judges would, he said, release him by habeas corpus. This case
shows judges not only unsympathetic to an injunction, but promising to
take active measures to help a party avoid punishment for its violation.
One scholar has written that "when the Chancellor claimed to arrest the
fruits of an unconscionable judgment, the seeds of a contest between 'the
two sides of Westminster Hall' were sown."'2 And this is no surprise: these
courts had, in a sense, competing jurisdictions. Both strove to maintain and
increase their power and authority-and the judges "feared that all suitors
would be drawn into Chancery if the power of the Chancellor to override
'""
2 When the Chancellor
or intercept their decisions became established ....
issued an injunction to a party to halt a proceeding at law, the judges were
deprived of their power to hear the case. When the injunction prohibited a
party who had prevailed at law from enforcing his judgment until the matter
could be heard in Chancery, "Itihe proceedings in Chancery look[ed] like an
illegitimate form of appeal,"'' at least to the judges. Furthermore, the legal
system was supposed to represent justice; it was hard for the judges to admit
that, although the procedures were followed correctly, the result was unjust.'1 Therefore, it can be said that the reaction of the judges to the
Chancellor's injunctions-at least to the injunctions that interfered with
common law proceedings-was, by the end of the fifteenth century, one of
26
some antagonism.
What was the reaction of Parliament? During this period Parliament
appears to have been adverse to the equity jurisdiction of Chancery generally,
not merely disenchanted with the use of injunctions. 27 Parliament enacted

121. At this point, Fairfax, one of the judges, suggested that if the injunction prohibited
the plaintiff from praying judgment, then the attorney (who was, strictly speaking, not bound
by the injunction) could do so. Id.
122. D. K .LY, supra note 11, at 89.
123. Id.at 107.
124. S. MmLoM, supra note 80, at 92.
125. Id. at 93.
126. Barbour, Fifteenth-Century Chancery, supra note 26, at 835.
127. See generally D. KIRaY, supra note 11, at 37-46. There were numerous complaints in
Parliament, from the beginning of the reign of Richard II (1377) onward, that Chancery was
interfering in matters that more properly belonged in common law courts. Parliament manifested
its disapprobation by insisting, on several occasions, that the Magna Charta declared that the

common law courts alone-not Chancery-had jurisdiction over the persons and property of
Englishmen. But these protestations appear to have been ineffectual in curbing Chancery. See
T. PLucKNETT, supra note 2, at 187-88.

There were several statutes and petitions from Parliament to the King that reflected Parlia-

ment's antipathy toward Chancery. In c. 1390, there were petitions which prayed that the
Chancellor not make any ordinance against the common law, and that no one be required to
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28
two statutes, known as statutes of Praemunire,1
which were thought by
some judges to have been intended to apply to Chancery-although this was
questionable, as will be shown. 129 These two statutes provided that a judgment
in a court of law shall not be impeached or attacked, but shall be kept in
peace unless overturned by attaint or error. 30

IV.

INJUNCTIONS IN OTHER COURTS 3 '

Chancery was not the only court to exercise an equitable jurisdic-

appear before Chancery on a matter which could be heard at common law. The King answered
these petitions evasively. D. KEIRy, supra note 11, at 38-39. A petition in 1415 denounced
Chancery's subpoena (used to compel defendants to appear) as a recently-invented subtlety;
and another in 1421 alleged that the subpoena was not "due process." The King bluntly rejected
these petitions. T. PLUCKNETr, supra note 2, at 188. A petition of Parliament in 1422 made
a serious attack on Chancery's power; it would have required that before a party could sue in
Chancery, two common law judges must certify that the common law has no remedy. 1 W.
HOLDSWORTH, supra note 27, at 459 n.7, pointed out that "this would clearly have put the
Chancery under control of the law courts." This provision never became effective. A statute
in 1436, 15 Hen. 6, ch. 4, required that no writ of subpoena issue from Chancery until sureties
had been found to pay for possible damage to defendant (in time, these sureties may have
become a fiction). It seems that most of the complaints in Parliament were prompted by the
numerous common law lawyers who were jealous of the growing jurisdiction of Chancery. D.
KERLY, supra note 11, at 37. See also Pollock, The Transformation of Equity, in ESSAYs IN
LEGAL HISTORY 293 (P. Vinogradoff ed. 1913), where Pollock said:
There is no reason to believe that the jurisdiction of the mediaeval Chancellors
was unpopular. Complaints began to be loud in the sixteenth century, and were
heard of earlier. But these were for the most part, if not altogether, made or
instigated by practitioners of the common law who were aggrieved by the growing
competition of Chancery. If the competition had not met a public want it would
not have been effective.
128. 27 Edw. 3, ch. 1 (1353); 4 Hen. 4, ch. 23 (1403).
129. See infra notes 289-300 and accompanying text.
130. Those who believed that these statutes applied to Chancery said that Chancery's in-'
junctions against the enforcement of judgments at law violated these statutes by not leaving
the judgments in peace.
131. A branch of the Chancery and a use of injunctions that was somewhat outside the
usual use of injunctions was what may be called Criminal Equity. See H. McCuNTocK, EQuITY
443 (1948), where McClintock wrote: "In the early days of equity the chancellors frequently
undertook to prevent acts of violence which were undoubted crimes. Most, if not all, of the
cases in which relief was given were cases in which a private suitor sought protection for his
person or property .... In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries there was no rule, as there
is in modern law, that equity would not enjoin a crime. An example of this branch of equity
was the case of Thomas Saintquintyn v. Roger de Wandesford (after 1396), reported in Baildon,
supra note 83, at 19-20, pl. 17. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant and others armed
themselves and hid in ambush to murder plaintiff and his people, and when the constable and
bailiffs learned of this and came to arrest them, the defendant and his men severely beat two
of the men, thereby causing the plaintiff to lose the services of his tenants and servants. The
plaintiff prayed for a "remedy in safeguard of the peace." Id. at 20.
There were other cases, and although some of them involved property rights, they were
instituted to preserve the peace and prevent crime. See Mack, Revival of CriminalEquity, 16
HAgv. L. REv. 389, 390 (1903). Mack explained that "as the government became more stable
and the courts of law more efficient, the need for a criminal equity lessened, and little by little
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tion.32 For.example, many of the local courts that developed in the fifteenth and

sixteenth centuries used equitable procedures. 33 In addition, the Court of the
Exchequer and the Court of Requests both had equitable jurisdictions.
The Court of the Exchequer 34 exercised equitable and injunctive powers.
Its equitable jurisdiction appears to have begun sometime before 1547 and,
from its inception, it increased in popularity.'3 It has been said, concerning
this jurisdiction, that "[tihe types of cases heard were, in general, equity
cases according to the usages and traditions of chancery. The early equity
cases, those before 1558, were founded on a broad range of equitable
grounds. The most frequent prayer was for an injunction for quiet possession
of property rights.' '1 36 The Court of the Exchequer retained its equitable
jurisdiction until the reforms of the courts of equity in 1841.
The Court of Requests 37 was another body with equitable and injunctive
powers. It was conceived by Henry VII (1485-1509) and became a functioning
court during his reign. 38 Although it later became known as the Court of
Requests, its original name was the Court of Poor Men's Causes, as it was
a court of equity for litigants who could not afford Chancery or common
law. This Court led a stormy existence and frequently clashed with the
common law courts. During Elizabeth's reign, the courts of law were becoming jealous of any jurisdiction other than their own. 39 They were especially antagonistic toward Chancery, and this antagonism recoiled upon
the lesser equity courts such as Requests.40 The judges denied that Requests
was a valid court and sought its elimination. They were unsuccessful; it
the chancellor's criminal jurisdiction fell off, until finally toward the end of the fifteenth century
it ceased entirely." Id. at 391 (footnotes omitted).
The King's Council also had criminal jurisdiction, and this became the Coart of the Star
Chamber. Although it did some valuable work in helping to curb lawlessness, "its summary
methods applied to the trial of crimes eventually became arbitrary and tyrannical, and the court
became so odious that it was abolished by statute in 1645." Id. (footnote omitted).
132. See W. BRYSON, THE EQUITY SinE oF Tm EXCHEQUER 1 (1975) ("Equity was bigger

than Chancery and... others besides the lord high chancellor had a hand in its development.").
133. Id. at 7.
134. The Exchequer itself had jurisdiction over the King's revenues and financial rights, such
as his income from lands, fees, customs, duties, and fines.
135. W. BRYsoN, supra note 132, at 32-33.
136. Id. at 9 (emphasis added). On the same page, Bryson listed the following Exchequer
cases involving injunctions: Vaughan v. Twisden, E. 111/46 - K(1554-1555); Gyfforde v. Bishop
of Bangor, E. 111/46D - D.(1557); Bell v. James, E. 111/45 (1554-1558); Cotton v. Hamond,
E. 112/20/50 (1554-1558); Mantell v. Mayor of Wickhane, E. 112/3/22 (1558). Id. at 9 n.2.
137. See generally SELECT CASES iN THE COURT OF REQUESTS A.D. 1497-1569 (Selden Society
Vol. 12) (I. Leadam ed. 1898) [hereinafter cited as 12 SELDEN SociETY]. I am heavily indebted
to the Introduction in this volume for the following discussion.
138. 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 27, at 413. Holdsworth fixes the date of its origin at
1493.
139. Id. at 414.
,140. See Yale, Introduction to LORD NoTTiNaHAm's 'MANUAL OF CHANCERY PRACTICE' AND
'PROLEGOMENA OF CHANCERY AND EQUtTY' (D. Yale ed. 1965) Introduction at 11 [hereinafter
cited as LOaD NoTrnaliHA's 'MANUAL OF CHANCERY PRACTICE'].
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continued to gain popularity, and by 1627 entertained as many suits as
4
Chancery itself.' '
The principal cause of the judge's animosity was Requests' frequent use
of injunctions to stay suits in other courts.
Its injunctions 'to stay the sutes [sic] at common lawe [sic]' were numerous. They included suits upon bonds or specialties for debt, for
performance of covenants, upon leases, upon titles of land, upon actions
of the case, for trespass, and debt. Injunctions were also issued to the
Courts of the Cinque Ports and to the Courts of the Universities, and
all the courts were comprised in the injunctions laid upon defendants
not to arrest, sue, or impede the plaintiff during the dependence of his

suit in this court, or after judgment given by

it.142

The judges in the Court of Requests believed that these injunctions were
necessary if a party were conducting or using another proceeding inequitably;
Requests would then issue such injunctions even though this raised the ire
14 3
of the other courts.
This dispute over the use of injunctions eventually led to direct conflict.
In a case in 1593, the Court of Common Pleas issued a writ of prohibition
against a plaintiff who had sued in the Court of Requests. 44 A few years
later, in another case, Requests issued an injunction to stop a party from
proceeding in Common Pleas, but Common Pleas issued a prohibition against
Requests in response, and the prohibition prevailed.' 45 There were also instances of Queen's Bench issuing prohibitions in cases where Requests had
granted injunctions to stay proceedings in Queen's Bench. 46 These cases
reveal the strife that was engendered when the Court of Requests used
injunctions to arrest proceedings or judgments at law.
Both the Court of the Exchequer and the Court of Requests issued injunctions. But their use in Exchequer was minor compared to that of Chancery, and did not shape the path along which injunctions were to develop.
The Court of Requests, also, was not a major force in the injunction's
development because the Court of Requests was abolished in 1641. To trace
the history of injunctions, one must return to Chancery.

141. 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 27, at 415.
142. Leadarn, Introduction, 12 SELDEN SocIaY at xxii.
143. W. JoNs, THE ELIZABETHAN COURT OF CHANCERY 469 (1967).
144. Lemmond v. de Malignes, reprinted in Leadam, Introduction, 12 SELDEN SOCIETY at
xxxviii. The purpose of this writ of prohibition was, presumably, to prevent the plaintiff from
continuing the action in Requests.
145. Tatnall v. Gomersall (1598), reprinted in Leadam, Introduction, 12 SEMEN SOCIETY at
xxxvii. Here Requests appears to have been in the right. The plaintiff (in Requests) had paid
an obligation, in full, to the defendant in installments, but the defendant sued on the bond in
Common Pleas. The Court of Requests then granted an injunction to stay that suit.
146. See id.
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V.

THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY

As time passed, injunctions became more frequent and more important.
They were important because they provided a means by which Chancery
could, as noted earlier, 47 supplement some of the deficiencies of the common
law, such as by issuing injunctions to prevent threatened harm. 48 Injunctions
also enabled Chancery to implement concepts not recognized by the common
law-such as fraud or duress-and to enjoin proceedings at law so that
Chancery could apply these concepts in appropriate cases. In the words of
one commentator:
The use of injunctions to stay actions at law was almost coeval with the
establishment of the chancery jurisdiction. Without this means of interference to protect the rights of its suitors, the court of chancery could
never have established, extended, and enforced its own jurisdiction. It
is no exaggeration to say that, during its formative periods, the equitable

jurisdiction was built up through the instrumentality of the injunction
restraining the prosecution of legal actions, where the defendants sought

the aid of chancery, which alone could take cognizance of the equities

that would defeat a recovery at law against them. This was not accomplished, however, without a long and severe opposition from
19 the common
law judges, which continued until the reign of James I. '
Another reason that injunctions were essential was that they allowed Chancery to protect its jurisdiction. If a bill had been filed first in Chancery, the
Chancellor could enjoin a suit later in common law involving the same
matter.
A.

A Note on Chancery Procedure

In order to properly assess injunction cases, a general description of
Chancery procedures is helpful. These procedures were informal and much
less technical than those of the common law. 50 Plaintiff would send his
bill-often simple or even illiterate-to Chancery, requesting that a subpoena
be issued to compel the defendant to come forward to be examined. When
the defendant appeared,' the Chancellor would examine plaintiff and
defendant (and any witnesses) under oath. The Chancellors turned aside
attempts by common law lawyers to introduce technical pleadings, such as
replications and rejoinders, preferring to keep the procedures simple. An

147. See supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text.
148.
149.
150.
151.
demur,

1 W. HoL swoRTH, supra note 27, at 458.
J. Po.mEoy, A TREATIsE ON EQUrrY JURISPRUDENCE § 1360, at 2699-2700 (3d ed. 1905).
See generally 5 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 27, at 285-86.
The defendant could make a written response to plaintiff's bill, such as an answer or
in addition to appearing for examination. Id.
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injunction could be requested either in the bill of complaint or in a separate
motion after the proceedings had begun.152

B.

Injunction Cases-Sixteenth and Early Seventeenth Centuries

The number of cases in Chancery continued to increase in the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries, 53 and injunction cases were a large part of this
growth. 5 4 When examining injunction cases during this period,'55 it is convenient to divide them into those that are related to property, tort, and
miscellaneous areas of law, and those that involve injunctions to stay pro56
ceedings of law.1

1. Property
Injunctions in Chancery involved many types of real property cases. Probably the majority of injunctions at this time pertained to property or property
rights.
In one type of case, the Chancellor would grant an injunction to prevent
interference with a party's possession of property pending trial-a temporary
or interlocutory injunction. 57 The Chancellor might alternatively order a
party who had obtained possession of property after the bill was filed in
Chancery to restore possession to the other party, as was done in Hawkes
v. Champion. 58 This was, in a sense, using an injunction to quiet possession,
at least pending trial, and it was a use that was essential in order for Chancery
59
to settle questions of ownership.
Injunctions to quiet possession, in some instances founded upon the
advice of the judges, granted sometimes until trial at law, sometimes

152. W. JoNEs, supra note 143, at 184.
153. 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 27, at 409. Holdsworth said of the growing popularity
of Chancery that, "the constantly increasing number of cases which it heard during the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries shows that it satisfied a real want." Id. He gave these statistics:
while Sir Thomas More was Chancellor (1529-1532) about 500 Chancery cases were started, an
average of about 140 per year. During the reign of James I (c. 1603-1625), an average of about
1,464 suits were started each year in Chancery. During Nottingham's tenure as Chancellor
(1673-1682) an average of 1,650 suits were begun each year. Id. at 409-10.
154. 5 W. HoLDswoRTn, supra note 27, at 321.
155. Just as noted above concerning the records of the 14th and 15th century Chancery
proceedings, see supra text accompanying notes 85-89, the records and case reports for this
later period are also fragmentary. The case reports generally do not begin until c. 1550, and
they are not full and complete opinions but usually only a few sentences, with the facts frequently
vague and the reasoning often absent. See generally W. HOLDSWORTH, SouRcas AND LrrERATuR
OF ENGLISH LAW 177-202 (1925).
156. This classification of cases was suggested by 5 W. HOLDSWORT-, supra note 27, at 321.
157. 1 G. SPENCE, supra note 6, at 673. In fact, the judges in the courts of law sometimes
suggested that a party seek this type of injunction from Chancery. Id.
158. Cary 36, 21 Eng. Rep. 20 (Ch. 1558).
159. 5 W. HoLDswoRTH, supra note 27, at 336.
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until the hearing in Chancery, and sometimes, after the right had been
established in one way or the other, in perpetuity, are found in many
cases during this period, and they formed one of the matters in contest
in the great dispute between the Chancellors and the judges.16

Another use of injunctions was to stop repeated actions at law for ejectment
or possession by the same party concerning the same property, 6' for the
common law did not prohibit the losing party from suing again.
In another area of property law, landlords and tenants sought injunctions
to enforce their respective rights and duties. In one case, 6 2 Chancery allowed
an interpleader; a tenant who was uncertain which of two defendants should
properly receive his rent was permitted to pay it into court. Chancery then
enjoined the defendants from molesting the tenant during the suit, provided
he continued to pay his rent into court. The Chancellor issued an injunction
in another suit to enforce a judgment of justices of assizes concerning tenant
rights. 63 In a decision upholding a tenant's rights, where the landlord had
repossessed the property, Chancery granted the tenant "an injunction for
the corn" he had sown.1' 4 The Chancellor also enforced obligations tenants
owed their landlords, as in Litton v. Couper 61 There the Chancellor issued
an injunction requiring the tenant to perform the obligations he owed the
lord of the manor: to pay rent, to do suit and service at the lord's court,
and to pay the appropriate fines and amercements for trespass or lack of
service.
Injunctions were also used to safeguard other property rights, such as to
grant access to or protection for common pasture land.16 In the case of
Atkins v. Temple, there was a bill to restrain the defendant from plowing
up ancient meadow and pasture ground which, it was claimed, "hath not
been plowed in the memory of man."' 67 The Chancellor enjoined the defendant from plowing the land. Injunctions were also issued to declare whether
easements for roads existed, 6s and to order that certain lands be enclosed

160. D. KERLY, supra note 11, at 149 (footnotes omitted). See also Kidnere v. Harrison,
Cary 48, 21 Eng. Rep. 26 (Ch. 1559-1560), and Sapcote v. Newport, Cary 47, 21 Eng. Rep.
25 (Ch. 1559-1560), for further examples of injunctions used to quiet possession.
161. See Denis v. Carew, Tothill 63, 21 Eng. Rep. 124 (Ch. 1618-1619).
162. Alnete v. Bettam, Cary 46, 21 Eng. Rep. 25 (Ch. 1559-1560).
163. Burtet v. Redman, Cary 47, 21 Eng. Rep. 26 (Ch. 1559-1560). In a similar decision,
Harper v. Midleton, Choyce Cases 180, 21 Eng. Rep. 104 (Ch. 1583-1584), tenants obtained
an injunction to protect the traditional tenurial customs and to prevent defendants from
disturbing tenants' possession by attempting to raise new ones.
164. Harrison v. Chomeley, Cary 51, 21 Eng. Rep. 28 (Ch. 1560-1561).
165. Cary 51, 21 Eng. Rep. 28 (Ch. 1563-1564).
166. See Lawrence v. Windham, Cary 64, 21 Eng. Rep. 34 (Ch. 1576-1577).
167. 1 Chan. Rep. 13, 21 Eng. Rep. 493 (1625-1626). See also Tothill 143-44, 21 Eng. Rep.
149, which lists several cases where Chancery enjoined plowing up "ancient pasture grounds."
168. See Wotton v. Wotton, Tothill 70, 21 Eng. Rep. 126 (Ch. 1634-1635) ("highway"
easement "decreed"); Powell v. Parsons, Tothill 70, 21 Eng. Rep. 126 (Ch. 1627) (declared
no easement existed).
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or enclosures continued. 69 Thus a great variety of property-related disputes
occasioned injunctions in Chancery, including cases to prevent threatened
damage (i.e., plowing up pasture) and cases to enforce various property
rights (possession, tenant obligations, etc.).
2. Tort
Injunctions involving torts-especially where damage or injury was imminent-were common. "The grant of injunctions in all cases of threatened
wrongs formed one of the chief branches of the Court's [Chancery] business . .

'" Although the cases in this section concern torts, many involve

torts against property; in the words of one commentator: "INlearly all the
torts against which an injunction was sought were, at this period, torts to
7
property."' '
There were frequent injunctions against waste 72 and nuisances. An injunction was sought against waste in Petetson v. Shelley, 73 where the plaintiff, who had a reversionary interest in land, wanted to prevent the present
tenant from committing waste of the timber. A case concerning nuisance
74 where plaintiff alleged that defendant had
was Osburne v. Barter,1
wrongfully diverted water from plaintiffs mill by building a mill of his own;
plaintiff sought an injunction against this conduct. Bush v. Field 75 was a
case illustrating another type of threat to property. There plaintiff's property
was endangered when the defendant began tearing down a common wall
that joined their houses. Since defendant's demolition threatened the stability
of plaintiff's upper rooms, the Chancellor enjoined defendant from removing
any more of the wall until there could be a hearing.
Suitors also petitioned the Chancery for injunctions in cases involving
torts of duress' 76 or fraud. One writer has said, "[t]here are many cases in

169.
170.
171.
172.

See generally Tothill 109-12, 21 Eng. Rep. 138-39.
D. KERLY, supra note 11, at 150.
5 W. HOLDSWORT'H, supra note 27, at 325.
See D. KERLY, supra note 11, at 150:
Injunctions against waste were granted, not only where the Common Law
remedy of writ of waste would, but for some accidental bar, have lain, as for
instance, where a second life tenancy followed that vested in the offending party,
and therefore no one could claim the inheritance forfeited by the wasting, but
even where waste was by law allowed.
173. Choyce Cases 117, 21 Eng. Rep. 72 (Ch. 1577). This case was very similar to an earlier
case, noted supra note 108 and accompanying text.
174. Choyce Cases 176, 21 Eng. Rep. 102 (Ch. 1583-1584). See also Swayne v. Rogers, Cary
26, 21 Eng. Rep. 14 (Ch. 1604), another case where the plaintiff sought an injunction because
actions of the defendant had stopped the flow of water to plaintiffs mill.
175. Cary 90, 21 Eng. Rep. 48 (Ch. 1579-1580).
176. 5 W. HoLDswoRTH, supra note 27, at 328. Holdsworth observed that "[i]n
the case of
duress the common law gave a remedy; but it would seem that at this period the Court of
Chancery exercised a concurrent jurisdiction." Id.
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which the court [Chancery] relieved against fraud and sharp practice. ' 1
The Chancellor gave relief against fraud in a case 78 where the sale of property
was supposed to have been made conditional upon a marriage (which later
did not occur) but the condition had been fraudulently omitted from the
agreement. The Chancellor ordered a reconveyance to correct the fraud.
Thus the tort cases in this period involving injunctions included torts to
property-such as waste and nuisance-and nonproperty torts such as fraud
and duress.
3. Other Cases
In addition to property and tort, myriad other types of cases gave rise to
injunctions in the 1500's. In one case, 179 for example, the plaintiff had been
a suitor for the hand of the defendant, and had given her a tablet of gold.
After she married another, the plaintiff requested the Chancellor to order
her to return the gold. It appears, therefore, that the Chancellor could, by
injunction, compel the return of property where he deemed it equitable even
though there had been no agreement between the parties. In Wood v.
Tirrell,8 0 the plaintiff attempted to repair a house that he had agreed to
lease to defendant, but defendant threatened the workmen, preventing the
repairs. Plaintiff asked that the Chancellor prohibit defendant from interfering. In another decision, a temporary injunction was issued to prevent
the infringement of patents and copyrights'-a decree that sounds quite
modern. The Chancellor did not hesitate to employ injunctions in multifarious matters; an injunction was even used in one case to induce the parties
2
to settle.
It should be noted that an injunction was not available in every case of
hardship. A plaintiff could not, for example, obtain an injunction if the
predicament was due to his own misconduct. The Chancellor denied an

177. Id.
178. Birket v. Beresey, Choyce Cases 146, 21 Eng. Rep. 86 (Ch. 1581).
179. Young v. Burrell, Cary 54, 21 Eng. Rep. 29 (Ch. 1576). This case is similar to Margaret
Appilgarth v. Thomas Sergeantson, reported in T. PLUCKNETr & R. PoUND, supra note 12, at
196, and discussed supra note 112 and accompanying text.
180. Cary 59, 21 Eng. Rep. 32 (Ch. 1576-1577).
181. Wolfe v. Payne, 5 & 6 Eliz. at 143, as cited in 1 G. SPENCE, supra note 6, at 672 n.(e).
182. Stanebridge v. Hales, Cary 47, 21 Eng. Rep. 26 (Ch. 1559-1560). Here plaintiff (in
Chancery) had been sued at law by defendant for a debt of 500 pounds. Chancery ordered

that its earlier injunction to stay that suit would be dissolved unless plaintiff brought 223
pounds into Chancery. If he did, execution upon the remainder of the debt would be stayed
until further order of the Chancellor. 5 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 27, at 336, said that it

appears that in this case, an injunction is being used "to enforce a compromise between parties
to an action at law."
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injunction in a case where the plaintiff, when he uttered words that gave
rise to an action on the case, had been drunk." 3
4. Injunctions Restraining Actions and Judgments at Law
It was not unusual, at this time, for Chancery to issue injunctions that
prevented parties from continuing an action or enforcing a judgment at law.
The Chancellors did not believe that they were overstepping their powers,
as these injunctions were addressed only to the party, not to the court of
law or the judge.s 4 Perhaps the Chancellors allowed their concern for justice
to exceed their circumspection. It has been suggested that these injunctions
were easy to obtain," 5 that the Chancellors issued them on surmises, without
requiring proof. 8 6 It is difficult to tell whether this was true.
Injunctions restraining proceedings or judgments at law have been called
"the most practically important class of injunctions."'81 7 Another scholar has
written concerning them:
The most frequent exercise of the jurisdiction of the Court [Chancery]
in granting injunctions was to restrain proceedings at law. It must have
been very soon found that without such an interference, it would be
impossible for the court to carry out the jurisdiction it had assumed of
controlling the law on the principles of equity and conscience. Accordingly, from the time of Henry VI. downwards, we find numerous instances of the granting of such injunctions.lu
In many cases, there were sound reasons to issue injunctions of this kind,
even to restrain a party from enforcing a judgment at law. "[These judgments at law, not in Chancery, were often given without any reference to
the conduct of the parties, and were sometimes got (sic) by very sharp
practice."' 8 19 Chancery could assess the suit to determine if a party had acted
inequitably or if one of the areas overlooked by the common law-i.e.,
fraud, duress, mistake-was involved. The inability of the courts of law to

183. Kendrick v. Hopkins, Cary 93, 21 Eng. Rep. 50 (Ch. 1579-1580). See 5 W. HOLDSWORTH,
supra note 27, at 329-30, for a description of this decision. See also Power v. Copperinger,
MONRO, AcTA CANCELLARIA 219-20, as cited in 5 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 27, at 330 n.l.
In that case, plaintiff asked the Chancellor to relieve him of a gambling debt incurred while
drunk. The Chancellor refused.
184. F. MArrLaND, EQUITY 9 (A. Chaytor & W. Whitaker eds. 1932).
185. I G. SPENCE, supra note 6, at 672 n.(b) (citing 2 R. NORTH, LIFE OF LoRD GUtMDFoan

79).
186. Id. at 676 ("It was common practice at this time to issue injunctions on mere surmises").

187. 5 W. HoLnswoRT, supra note 27, at 325.
188. 1 G. SPENCE, supra note 6, at 673-74 (footnotes omitted). Holdsworth concurred,
explaining why these injunctions were essential: if parties had been free to ignore Chancery
and pursue their rights at law, Chancery would have been unable to grant effective relief. 5
W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 27, at 335.
189. 5 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 27, at 326.
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grant relief gave rise to Chancery's injunctions1 9° The judges were most
disconcerted when injunctions stopped a party from executing a judgment;
but despite their opposition, the Chancellors continued to issue these injunctions during the 1500's and early 1600's.
In the sixteenth century, Chancery continued the practice of enjoining
proceedings where the legal process was being abused. For example, in one
case the plaintiff sued at law when he learned that the defendant would be
unable to defend because all the defendant's witnesses were overseas. 19' The
Chancellor enjoined the action. Another suit was enjoined because the plaintiff had filed it solely to prevent the defendant from giving testimony against
the plaintiff in another cause. 92 In a case where the plaintiff filed first a
bill in Chancery and then a suit at law concerning the same dispute, the
Chancellor enjoined the suit at law so that defendant need not defend two
actions. 93 These and other abuses of legal procedures frequently resulted in
an injunction from Chancery.'

94

Injunctions could extend beyond the parties to include their attorneys and
counsellors. The latter could be enjoined from proceeding at law or enforcing
a judgment, 95 and they96 could be held in contempt of Chancery if they
violated the injunction.
The Chancellor issued injunctions to stay proceedings not only in the
97
major common law courts but in almost every court. Cases in King's Bench,
Exchequer, 19 Common Pleas, and Admiralty'" were enjoined, as were cases
in Ecclesiastical Court, 2°° the Court of Wards, 201 and other courts. But
Chancery would not permit those courts to restrain a party from proceeding
2
in Chancery.

190. Holdsworth commented that "[aill through this period the law made such scanty provision that the judges themselves admitted the necessity for the equitable jurisdiction." Id.
191. Swigo v. Hanbury, Choyce Cases 156, 21 Eng. Rep. 92 (Ch. 1581-1582).
192. Angrome v. Angrome, Choyce Cases 176, 21 Eng. Rep. 102 (Ch. 1583-1584).
193. Bill v. Body, Cary 50, 21 Eng. Rep. 27 (Ch. 1559-1560). As mentioned above, this also
allowed Chancery to protect its jurisdiction against encroachments from the common law courts.
See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
194. See also Rose v. Reinolds, Choyce Cases 147, 21 Eng. Rep. 87 (Ch. 1581) (injunction
issued to restrain a widow from proceeding with a dower action, since she had already obtained
the jointure she had been promised).
195. See Cotes v. Freston, Choyce Cases 108, 21 Eng. Rep. 67 (Ch. 1558).
196. See Allen v. Dingley, Choyce Cases 113, 21 Eng. Rep. 70 (Ch. 1576-1577). Perhaps
this was done to insure that the attorney would not pray for judgment if the injunction prohibited
only the party, a suggestion which was made by Fairfax, J., in Russell's Case, Y.B. 22 Edw.
4, pl. 37 (K.B. 1482); see also supra note 121.
197. Cliffe v. Tumor, Cary 83, 21 Eng. Rep. 44 (Ch. 1579).
198. Catwallell v. Wynn, Tothill 113, 21 Eng. Rep. 140 (Ch. 1593).
199. Aylett v. Aylett, Tothill 114, 21 Eng. Rep. 140 (Ch. 1590-1591).
2Q0. Beamont v. Harvy, Tothill 113, 21 Eng. Rep. 140 (Ch. 1631-1633).
201. Smith v. Snotsbull, Tothill 114, 21 Eng. Rep. 140 (Ch. 1590-1591).
202. 1 G. SPENCE, supra note 6, at 676.
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Several conclusions can be drawn from the injunction cases of the 1500's
and early 1600's. 203 A number of the attributes of injunctions noted earlier
continued during this period. Injunctions were still commonly used to protect
property rights; even tort cases often dealt with threatened harms to property.
The Chancellors also continued to issue injunctions in both prohibitory and
mandatory forms: prohibitory, to restrain the defendant from engaging in
certain acts; and mandatory, to require the defendant to undertake certain
acts. Several trends concerning injunctions which had been merely inchoate
now emerged. For example, Chancery came to recognize the distinction
between interlocutory or temporary injunctions and permanent or final ones;
and the former were becoming more common. Perhaps the most portentous
feature of injunctions in this period was that they were increasingly used to
stay actions or judgments at law. It appeared that, during this period, the
power to issue injunctions was indispensable if Chancery was to continue
24
to temper the rigidity of the common law with equity. 0
It is difficult to discern the emergence of general rules or principles
governing the issuance of injunctions during this time. This is, perhaps, due
in part to the short and scanty condition of the reported cases. 2 5 But a
more compelling reason is that at the close of the sixteenth century there
seem to have been, in fact, no binding rules, no clear and constant principles,
concerning injunctions. Chancery was still largely a court of conscience; the
Chancellor had almost unfettered discretion to grant an appropriate remedy
2
as his conscience dictated. 06
C.

Injunctions and the Relations Between
Courts of Law and Chancery

In the fifteenth century, the common law judges, although somewhat
irritated by injunctions that halted proceedings at law, were generally favorably disposed toward Chancery. This attitude continued throughout most

203. See generally 5 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 27, at 325.
204. Id. at 336.
205. See supra note 155.
206. See generally 5 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 27, at 336-38. It was this lack of definite
rules that caused John Selden (1584-1654) to remark:
Equity is a roguish thing, for law we... have a measure.... Equity is according
to [the] conscience of him [that] is Chancellor, and as [that] is larger or narrower
so... is equity[.] [']Tis all one as if they should make [the] standard for [the]
measure we... call a foot, to be [the] Chancellor's foot; what an uncertain measure
would this be; one Chancellor ha[s] a long foot another a short foot a third an
indifferent foot; ['T]is [the] same thing in [the] Chancellor[']s conscience.
J. SELDEN, TABLE TALK 43 (F. Pollock ed. 1927).
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7 which
of the sixteenth century. There were occasional decisions at law2w
reflected some animosity, but on the whole there were no major disruptions
in relations until Cardinal Wolsey's tenure as Chancellor from 1515 to 1529.
Cardinal Wolsey was accused of certain improprieties by articles of im208
peachment that were drawn up against him after he lost the royal favor

and was dismissed from office by Henry VIII:
[N]o complaint was made against him of bribery or corruption, and the
charges were merely that he had examined many matters in Chancery
after judgment had been given at common law; - that he had unduly
granted injunctions; - that when his injunctions were disregarded by the
Judges, he had sent for those venerable magistrates and sharply reprimanded them for their obstinancy.20

Thus it appears that Wolsey not only issued injunctions too freely, but was
also high-handed in his dealings with the judges. That there was friction
between the courts of law and Chancery during his Chancellorship is understandable.
After Wolsey and beginning with Thomas More (Chancellor from 1529
to 1532), the Chancellors were no longer predominantly cleric, but were
usually laymen, often common law lawyers such as More. One scholar
asserted that "the fact that English lawyers . . . presided over Chancery,

tended to keep the equity administered by the court of Chancery in close
touch with the development of the common law, and to improve the relations
210
between common law and equity.
After More became Chancellor, the hostility Wolsey created was dispelled
by More's probity and by his scrupulousness about issuing injunctions. "[H]e
made it a habit never to grant a subpoena till he was satisfied that the
plaintiff had some real ground of complaint. The result was that the number
21
of injunctionsgranted considerably decreased."
' When he heard that some

207. There were two King's Bench decisions, both during the reign of Edward IV, which
revealed some hostility toward Chancery. In one, Russell's Case, Y.B. 22 Edw. 4, pl. 37 (K.B.
1482), the judges stated that if the Chancellor imprisoned a party for disobeying an injunction,
they would release him by habeas corpus. See supra note 120 and accompanying text. In the
other case, Y.B. Pasch. 21 Edw. 4, pl. b (K.B. 1483), the Judge declared that if a case came
within the common law court's jurisdiction, King's Bench might prevent the parties from
resorting to any other jurisdiction; in other words, prevent them from seeking relief in Chancery.
This does not appear to have happened. But see W. JoNEs, supra note 143, at 466, who
suggested that these judicial remarks displaying hostility toward Chancery may have been given
undue emphasis by legal historians, since the threatened confrontations do not appear to have
materialized.
208. See generally 1 J. CAMPBELL, LnrEs oF THE LoPD

CHANCELLORS

390-419 (1868).

209. Id. at 462. See also 4 E. COKE, INsTrruTEs 88-95 (1628 & photo reprint 1979), for a
list of all 44 articles of impeachment against Wolsey.
210. 5 W. HoLDswoRTH, supra note 27, at 217 (emphasis added); see also T. PLUCKNETT,
supra note 2, at 688. Plucknett stated that the fact that the Chancellors were now generally
common law lawyers was crucial: "It is to this fact that we owe, no doubt, the cordial relations
which existed during Elizabeth's reign between common law and equity." Id.
211. 5 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 27, at 223 (emphasis added).
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judges were still perturbed by his injunctions, More invited all the judges
to dinner:
[A]nd after dinner, when he had broken with them what complaints he
had heard of his injunctions, and moreover showed them both the number
and causes of everyone of them, in order so plainly, that, upon full
debating of those matters, they were all enforced to confess that they,
in like case, could have done no otherwise themselves. Then offered he
this unto them; that if the justices of every court unto whom the reformation of the rigour of the law, by reason of their office, most
especially appertained, would upon reasonable considerations by their
own discretion, as they were, as he thought, in conscience bound, mitigate
and reform the rigour of the law themselves, there should from henceforth
by him no more injunctions be granted. Whereunto, when they refused
to condescend, then said he unto them, 'Forasmuch as yourselves, my
lords, drive me to that necessity for awarding out injunctions to relieve
22
the people's injury, you cannot hereafter any more justly blame me.'
Since the judges refused to mitigate the rigors of the common law, More
continued to issue injunctions when he believed them necessary. 2 a Despite
this, there is no doubt that "[tihe result of his tenure in office was to restore
21 4
harmonious relations between the Chancery and the common law courts.
Although More succeeded in effecting a rapprochement, the cause of
friction remained: Chancery's use of injunctions. 2 5 Enjoining legal proceedings in progress did not vex the judges as much as enjoining the enforcement
of judgments already obtained; a few decisions from courts of law even
denied that Chancery had this power. 216 The judges were disturbed by what
they saw as the capricious granting of injunctions, 2 7 and worried about loss
of profit2 8 and power. They believed that if Chancery could issue injunctions

212. W. ROPER, THm Lns OF Sm THOMAS MORE 34-35 (W. Rouse ed. 1924), quoted in 5
W. HoLDswoRTH, supra note 27, at 223-24.
213. "He was cautious in granting injunctions yet granted and maintained them with firmness,
where he thought that justice required his interference with the judgments of the Courts of
the common law .... ." 2 J. CAMPBELL, supra note 208, at 34. It also appears that More
thoroughly disposed of the backlog of cases that existed when he took over the Chancery. This
gave rise to a popular bit of doggerel:
When More sometime had Chancellor been
No more suits did remain.
The like will never more be seen
Till More be there again.
T. MAYNARD, HumANsT AS HERO: Tim Lin OF Sm THoMAs Mom 173 (1947).
214. 5 W. HoLDswoRTH, supra note 27, at 224.
215. Yale, Introduction, supra note 140, at 9.
216. See, e.g., Humfrey v. Humfrey, 3 Leonard 1718, 74 Eng. Rep. 513 (C.P. 1572) ("The
Chafncery after judgment could not enjoyn [sic] the party that he shall not sue forth execution.").
Despite such decisions, Chancery continued to do just that.
217. Chancellors did at times abuse their power and issue injunctions "indiscriminately and
on no ascertainable principle[s]." Yale, Introduction, supra note 140, at 10; see also supra note
186.
218. See 1 G. SPENCE, supra note 6, at 674 n.(e), where Spence states that the judges may
have been distressed by Chancery's interference because they received fees in each case that
was tried in their court.
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to prevent their judgments
from being enforced, Chancery's power would
219
be superior to their own.
An attempt was made to defuse complaints about Chancery's injunctions
by one of the Chancellors following More: Nicholas Bacon (Chancellor from
1558 to 1579, father of Francis Bacon). "It was while he was Chancellor
that we get the first detailed rules as to the procedure of the court,"2' 0 rules
which Chancery had been lacking. His procedural rules included a provision
that parties seeking injunctions must give security for the truth of their
allegations, " '1 which seems to have been in response to the accusation that
injunctions were issued indiscriminately.
Viewing the sixteenth century as a whole, it can be said that after Wolsey's
dismissal, relations between Chancery and the common law courts improved
and remained civil, although an underlying tension persisted: the dispute
over the use of injunctions to interfere with cases in the courts of law. It
was during the first part of the next century, in the reign of James I (16031625), that this dispute reached major proportions.
VI.

CONFLICT AND CONFRONTATION

A.

PoliticalFactors

In 1616, the tension between common law and Chancery flared into sharp
and open conflict. Before examining the details of this conflict, it is important
to understand some of the political factors at the time, for, although there
was unconcealed disagreement over the proper use of injunctions, there was
deeper and more serious political dissension beneath the surface.mn One
scholar has commented that "[tihe differences over injunctions were of long
standing and had been used to facilitate and promote political quarrels." 3
Perhaps the most serious point of political discord concerned the relationship between the King and the law. King James was an absolutist; he

219. See I W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 27, at 461. "The courts of common law saw well

enough that their supremacy was at stake." Id.
220. 5 W. HoLDswoRTH, supra note 27, at 228.
221. D. KRLy, supra note 11, at 150.
222. Yale, Introduction, supra note 140, at 12, stated that this was essentially a political

dispute:
Thus the solution of legal differences had to await a political settlement which

was not achieved with sufficient permanence till the Restoration. The further fact
that the last vestiges of the jurisdictional trouble disappear on the final political

settlement at the end of the century further relates the solution of the trouble to
the politics of the seventeenth century.
Pollock, supra note 127, at 294, maintained that the causes of the dispute "were not legal but

'political, and are to be found in the controversies between king and parliament, between prelates
and Puritans, which led to the Civil War."
223. Yale, Introduction, supra note 140, at 10.
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believed that the King was above the law 224 and was the source of law. 22"
The Chancellor at the time, Lord Ellesmere (Chancellor, 1596-1617), had
strong royalist proclivities and would not tolerate arguments against the
King's prerogative. 226 Edward Coke (Chief Justice, Common Pleas 16061613; Chief Justice, King's Bench 1613-1616), on the other hand, was a
staunch advocate of the common law; he maintained, along with many
lawyers, judges, and members of Parliament, that the law was independent
227
and above the king.

From this primary disagreement, others followed, over such questions as
the proper role of the common law judges. King James thought that the
judges were officers of the crown, 228 and thus bound to speak as he directed
them229-clearly a subservient position. 230 Coke craved an independent judiciary. His position was, according to one scholar, that "the common law
was the supreme law in the state, and the judges, unfettered and uncontrolled
save by the law itself, were the sole exponents of this supreme law."' 231 A

related subject of contention was the role of the King's prerogative and the
prerogative courts, especially Chancery. The King and his supporters held
that the King's prerogative was supreme, 232 and that Chancery, as a prerogative court, could do whatever the King desired, being accountable only to

him. 233 The supporters of the common law asserted that the King's prerogative
was subject to legal limitations, and that the common law judges were
obligated to see that these limitations were not exceeded.234 They were suspicious of the Chancellor because he was an important minister, 235 on intimate
terms with the King, and because his power was susceptible of being used
by the King to further the King's political ends. 21 6 Given these views, it is

224. James saw this conflict in 1616 as an opportunity to demonstrate that he was "the
supreme lord of all the justice that was done in his name." F.W. MArrAND,History of English
Law, in SELECTED HISTORICAL ESSAYS OF F.W. MAriAN 133 (H. Cam ed. 1957).
225. 2 G. TREVELYAN, HisToRY OF ENGLAND 167 (1927).

226. 5 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 27, at 231.
227. 2 G. TREVELYAN, supra note 225, at 188-92.
228. 5 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 27, at 428.
229. 2 G. TREVELYAN, supra note 225, at 188-92.
230. 9 G. DAVIES, OXFoRD HISTORY OF ENGLAND, TnE EARLY STuARTs 1603-1660, at 21 (2d
ed. 1959).
231. 5 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 27, at 428.
232. Id.
233. Holdsworth says that the royalists maintained the Chancellor had "absolute power to
purge the defendant's conscience." Id. at 235. But see T. PLUCKNE'r, supra note 2, at 193,
where Plucknett argued that the royalists' claim of Chancery's "absolute power" was unfounded; Chancery's procedures were becoming settled and the arbitrary element of equity had
largely been eliminated.
234. 9 G. DAViEs, supra note 230, at 20.
235. 5 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 27, at 236-37.
236. Id. See also Barbour, Fifteenth-Century Chancery, supra note 26, at 858, who explained
this mistrust of Chancery: "Such is the political power of the Chancellor that, if his action be
arbitrary and unrestrained, it may be utilized for purely political ends; it is not so much the
Chancellor as the king who may deride the common law."
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not surprising that Coke and the common law lawyers wanted to limit
7
Chancery's jurisdiction.2
B.

Ellesmere and Coke

Clearly, Ellesmere and Coke held widely divergent views on the question
of whether Chancery could properly restrain parties from enforcing judgments at law. Ellesmere believed that this function was neither improper nor
illegal but indispensable. Without it, Chancery would need the permission of
common law in order to administer equity; 281 the Chancellor would be unable
to remedy unconscionable acts by which parties sometimes obtained judgments at law.7Y9 As Chancellor, Ellesmere did not hesitate to act on this
belief; it has been said that "[h]e encouraged suits in Chancery after judgment
had been given at common law,"m" that he issued some injunctions indiscriminately,m4 and that he was too quick to imprison parties who disobeyed
his injunctions. 242 It must, however, be set down to his credit that he promulgated rules to govern the issue of injunctions, apparently to prevent their
being issued too freely.243
Coke denied that Chancery could stay the execution of common law judgments, and is said to have announced in open court (King's Bench) that any
lawyer who sought an injunction to stay a judgment would be forever barred
from presenting cases in King's Bench. 2" He insisted that it was illegal to examine a judgment, to reopen it in Chancery. 245 Therefore Coke began to release, by habeas corpus, parties that Ellesmere had imprisoned for disregarding

injunctions by continuing suits or enforcing judgments. 246 Thus, Coke24 7
237. 1 W. HoLDswoRn, supra note 27, at 461.
238. See 5 W. HoLDswoRTH, supra note 27, at 236.
239. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
240. J. BAKER, supra note 76, at 92.
241. Yale, Introduction, supra note 140, at 10.
242. W. JoNEs, supra note 143, at 470.
243. Lord Ellesmere "had ... gone to some lengths to check the indiscriminate use of injunction by laying down certain rules to govern their issue." Yale, Introduction, supra note
140, at 71. These procedural rules stated that injunctions were available in only three situations:
where the defendant refused to come to court and was in contempt; where the defendant
confessed the matter; or where the complaint was proved. Id. This appeared to be an attempt
to eliminate injunctions granted solely upon the petitioner's allegations.
244. 2 J.C~PnBEL, supra note 208, at 364.
245. Id. at 386. Coke asserted that this was a violation of the statutes of Praemunire. See
infra notes 269-312 and accompanying text.
246. Coke also urged the released prisoners to prosecute all those involved for the alleged
criminal offense of violating the statutes of Praemunire by obtaining an injunction after a
judgment in a court of law. J. BAKER, supra note 76, at 92.
247. Coke's single-minded devotion to the cause of the common law has been thought by
some to have become rather excessive. See 5 W. HOLDSwORTH, supra note 27, at 437 ("[H]is
views as to [the common law's] supremacy had become a matter of settled belief not wholly
devoid of fanaticism.").
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staked out his ground as being firmly opposed to this use of injunctions .248

An additional factor in the clash between the courts of law and Chancery
was the personalities involved: both Ellesmere and Coke were very strongwilled, even intolerant. 249 There was little of that spirit of cooperation that existed when More was Chancellor.
C.

Cases Leading to the 1616 Dispute

Preceding the case in 1616 that was the focus of the conflict between
courts of law and Chancery, there were a number of decisions concerning
the propriety of Chancery enjoining parties from proceeding with suits or
judgments at law. 250 These cases set the stage for the confrontation which
occurred in 1616.
5
In 1589, there was an indictment on the statute of Praemunir&
against
an attorney for seeking an injunction against the execution of a judgment
at law, but the indictment was not brought to trial. 2 2 The very fact of an
indictment, however, shows a mounting dissatisfaction with this kind of
injunction. Chancery did not, however, remain quiescent; there was a case
in 1594 where the Chancellor imprisoned both a party and his attorney for
continuing a suit at law in spite of an injunction, and it appears that parties
in other cases were similarly punished. 253 These minor skirmishes between
the courts of law and Chancery at the close of the 1500's portended a more
serious altercation in the 1600's.
There were decisions of courts of law during this period that, on their
face, appeared to have resolved the issue by prohibiting Chancery from
enjoining proceedings at law. Coke reported a decision, Throckmorton v.
Finch,25 4 which seems to have held that the Chancellor did not have the
power to hear a dispute (or issue an injunction) after a judgment at law.
Finch, the defendant (in Chancery), had obtained a judgment, which was
affirmed on a writ of error. Throckmorton, the plaintiff, then sought an

248. See T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 2, at 194, who pointed out that the supporters of the
common law in this controversy "had to take up the difficult position that ... the injunction
against enforcing a judgment obtained by fraud was reprehensible, and a number of other
equally doubtful theses."
249. See Yale, Introduction, supra note 140, at 12; J. BAKER, supra note 76, at 92. Baker
commented that "[t]he trouble in 1616 was largely caused by a clash of strong personalities."

Id.

250. Some of these cases have been discussed. See, e.g., supra note 120 and accompanying
text. See generally cases cited supra notes 182-206.
251. See infra notes 281-87 and accompanying text.
252. 2 J. CAMPBELL, supra note 208, at 362.
253. W. JoNrs, supra note 143, at 469; see also cases cited supra notes 195-96 and accom-

panying text.
254. See 4 E. CorE, supra note 209, at 86.
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injunction from Chancery to stay execution of the judgment. Finch claimed
that, by virtue of his judgment at law, he need not respond to the bill in
Chancery. When Chancellor Ellesmere ordered him to answer, the defendant
petitioned Queen Elizabeth, who referred the matter to all the judges. The
judges, while acknowledging that the plaintiff had good cause for relief, 255
decided that defendant was not required to respond; the Chancellor could
not examine a case after there had been a judgment at law .2 6 Coke believed
that this case was decided correctly,2 7 and was controlling, but Ellesmere
continued issuing such injunctions, and the problem persisted.
Several years after Throckmorton, there was a short decision from King's
Bench (where Coke was Chief Justice)-Heathv. Rydley2 5 -which stated as
follows:
In an action of debt at the common law, judgment being against the
defendant, and day given to move in arrest thereof, he in the interim
preferred his bill in Chancery, and obtained an injunction to stay judgment and execution: but, notwithstanding the Court granted both ....
,29

In other words, in Heath, King's Bench proceeded to enter judgment and
allow execution, despite the injunction, because the judges believed that
parties must submit to a judgment at law (obtained, if not yet entered),
unless that judgment was reversed by error or attaint. 260 In the course of
this decision, the judges referred to a recent case that held that courts of
equity were to be prohibited from hearing matters cognizable at common
law. 261 The ruling in Heath, where a court of law allowed a party to ignore

255. See Courtney v. Glanvil, Croke's James 344, 79 Eng. Rep. 294 (K.B. 1614), where the
facts of Throckmorton are discussed in more detail. In Throckmorton, a lease was declared
void due to nonpayment of rent. The nonpayment involved an incident that happened about
30 years before the suit, when Throckmorton's rent was late because his servant, who was
carrying the money to make the rent payment, was robbed. Throckmorton paid the rent the
very next day, and it was accepted.
According to the discussion in Courtney, the judges said that Throckmorton's bill in Chancery
"comprehended much matter of equity, and there was very good cause he should have been
relieved," but they ruled that Chancery could not grant relief because he waited until after the
judgment at law. Courtney, Croke's James 344, 79 Eng. Rep. at 294.
256. Since the common law judges had long been opposed to Chancery's enjoining parties
from enforcing judgments, their decision here was predictable. See D. KIRLY, supra note 11,
at 110 ("In fact the question in dispute being referred to one of the parties [because the dispute
was actually between law and Chancery the judges were a party] was naturally decided in that
party's favour .... ").
257. See 4 E. CoKE, supra note 209, at 86. Coke commented that although the Chancellor,
in such cases, may claim to be examining the conduct of the defendant, not the judgment,
"he would by his decree take away the effect of the judgment .. . ." Id. Coke did not equivocate
when stating his view on whether Chancery should be permitted to do this: "But that such a
course should be permitted, it should be not only full of inconvenience, but directly against
the laws and statutes of the Realm . . . ." Id.
258. Croke's James 336, 79 Eng. Rep. 286 (K.B. 1613).
259. Id. at 336, 79 Eng. Rep. at 286 (emphasis added).
260. This was the common law view of the statutes of Praemunire.
261. See Heath, Croke's James at 335-36, 79 Eng. Rep. at 286. The Heath court does not
name this prior case.
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Chancery's injunction, was yet a further illustration that the courts of law
were fundamentally opposed to Chancery on the issue of injunctions.
An opinion by Chancellor Ellesmere in 1615262 set forth, in no uncertain
terms, Chancery's position. Ellesmere explained that if a judgment had been
obtained by oppression, wrong, or "hard conscience," he would set it aside,
not for any defect in the judgment itself, but because of the "hard conscience" of the party. 263 Chancery, Ellesmere wrote, did not examine the truth
264
or justice of a judgment; it examined only the conduct of the parties.
Another significant case before the conflict in 1616265 was Courtney v.
Glanvil,266 decided in King's Bench in 1614. The defendant had defrauded
the plaintiff by selling him a jewel worth 20 pounds for 360 pounds. The
defendant then sued at law on the bond he had received in payment and
obtained a judgment. The plaintiff, discovering the fraud, brought a writ
of error at law to reverse the judgment, but the judgment was affirmed.
The plaintiff then resorted to Chancery. The Chancellor ordered the defendant to take back the jewel and release the judgment. When he refused, he
267
was imprisoned.

Coke and the King's Bench then released the defendant on bail by a writ
of habeas corpus, even though he still refused to comply with the Chancellor's

injunction. Coke justified this by asserting that the injunction and the imprisonment, coming after a judgment at law, were illegal. It is unfortunate
that Coke and the supporters of the common law were forced to defend
judgments upholding the egregious conduct of parties like Glanvil and Finch.M
In both cases, the common law did not provide relief, even upon a writ of
error, when the unconscionable actions were proved.

262. Earl of Oxford's Case, I Ch. Rep. 1, 21 Eng. Rep. 485 (Ch. 1615).
263. Id. at 10, 21 Eng. Rep. at 487.
264. Id. at 7, 21 Eng. Rep. at 486.
265. There appears to be some uncertainty about whether Courtney, Croke's James 344, 79
Eng. Rep. 294, preceded the 1616 dispute, or whether it actually was the case that was the
focus of the conflict. See T. PLTJcKNETr,
supra note 2, at 194, who seems to say that Courtney
was the case which precipitated the conflict. Other commentators are noncommittal. See, e.g.,
I W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 27, at 461-63. But see D. KERLY, supra note 11, at 110-15,
who discussed Courtney and then described the facts of the case at the heart of the 1616
crisis-clearly not Courtney but a later case (one that involved a key witness being lured away
from the courthouse to a tavern to drink). See Wilson, Life of James I, in T. PLucKN=EIT &
R. POUND, supra note 2, at 202.03. Perhaps the most compelling reason for concluding that
Courtney was not the case involved in 1616 is that the 1616 case was not resolved but was
appealed to King James, as we will see, whereas the report of the case of Courtney, Croke's
James 344, 79 Eng. Rep. 294, ends with a clear conclusion-the defendant was released on
bail and discharged by King's Bench the following term. Id. at 295. It is, however, curious to
note that the extant documents surrounding the 1616 dispute do not list the case name.
266. Croke's James 344, 79 Eng. Rep. 294 (K.B. 1614); see also D. KEsuY, supra note 11,
at 110 (discussing Courtney); I W. HoLDswoRT-, supra note 27, at 461-62 (same).
267. Croke's James 344, 79 Eng. Rep. at 294.
268. See supra note 255.
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These cases show an increasing hostility between the courts of law and
Chancery, and an increasing willingness to imprison or to release parties to
undo the actions of the (by now) rival courts. Decisions by Chancery or the
courts of law on the issue of whether an injunction could prohibit a party
from enforcing a judgment did not appear to be sufficient to resolve the
impasse.

D.

The Dispute Itself-1615-1616

The controversy between common law and Chancery culminated in a case
that arose in King's Bench in 1615-1616.269 In this action, 270 the plaintiff had
inveigled the defendant's main witness to a tavern to drink when he was
supposed to testify, and told the judge that the witness was not at court
because he was deathly ill. As a result, the plaintiff obtained a judgment.
Defendant then persuaded the Chancellor to enjoin the plaintiff from enforcing the judgment. Then, 27' it appears that Coke, as Chief Justice of
King's Bench, endeavored to have everyone involved in the injunction, including Chancellor Ellesmere, indicted for violating the statutes of Praemunire. The Chancellor at this point acquainted King James with the situation, and the King, taking an unusal step, referred the dispute to a commission
of four men: 272 Sir Francis Bacon, his Attorney General; Sir Henry Montague
and Sir Randall Crew, his Serjeants [sic] at Law; and Sir Henry Yelverton,
his Solicitor. Their task was to investigate and report on two specific aspects
of this dispute. 273 First, they were to examine court records to determine

269. Holdsworth gave the following explanation for the conflict between the courts of law
and Chancery:
The revival of the quarrel between the common law courts and the court of
Chancery at the end of the sixteenth and the beginning of the seventeenth centuries
was due partly to the claim made by Coke that the common law and the common
law alone must decide the ambit of the jurisdiction of all rival courts; partly to
the constitutional differences between common lawyers who asserted the supremacy
of the common law, and other lawyers who asserted the supremacy of the prerogative; partly to the undoubted fact that equity could not function properly
unless it could stop litigants who wished to make an inequitable use of their legal
rights; and partly to the temper of the two principal disputants-Coke and Ellesmere.
W. HOLDSWORTE, SoME MAKERS oF ENGLISH LAW 99 (1938).
270. See Wilson, supra note 265, at 202-03, and D. KRLY, supra note 11, at 113-15, for
two accounts of this case. It appears that none of the existing reports of this decision gives it
a name.
271. At this point, the reports of the case differ somewhat. Wilson, supra note 265, at 20203, says that the Chancellor imprisoned the plaintiff for refusing to obey the injunction. D.
KERLY, supra note 11, at 113-15, does not mention imprisonment of the plaintiff.
272. It appears that a fifth man, John Walter, was later added to the commission. The
King's Order and Decree in Chancery, Cary 133, 21 Eng. Rep. 65 (1616).
273. See generally The King's Order and Decree in Chancery, Cary 115-35, 21 Eng. Rep.
61-65 (1616), for the correspondence, findings, and reports of this commission.
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whether there were precedents in which Chancery had granted equitable relief
even though a judgment at law had already been obtained.274 Second, the
members of the commission were asked whether Chancery could properly
issue an injunction to restrain a party from enforcing a judgment at law.
This was asked of them in the form of a hypothetical: if A obtained a
judgment at law against B, and B wished to raise in defense certain matters
of conscience and equity which the judges at law did not recognize, could
B complain in Chancery? And, more importantly, did the statutes of Praemunire, or any other statutes, prevent Chancery from granting relief in this
275
situation?

E.

The Commission's Report and the King's Order

276
The commission's report on existing precedents contained thirteen points,
the most significant of which were as follows:

2. We find that there hath been a strong current of practice of
proceeding in Chancery after judgment, and many times after execution,
continued from the beginning of Henry the Seventh's reign, unto the
time of the Lord Chancellor that now is ... it being in cases where there
is no remedy for the subject, by the strict course of the common law,
unto which the Judges are sworn. 27
8. We find in said cases, not only the bill preferred, but motions,
orders, injunctions, and decrees thereupon, for the discharging and releasing of the judgments. ..

.

10. We find that the Judges themselves, in their own Courts, when
there appeared unto them matter of equity, because by their oath and

274. See id. at 115, 21 Eng. Rep. at 61 (letter from Chancellor Ellesmere to Francis Bacon,
dated 19 March 1615, requesting that the commission undertake this investigation).
275. This second part of the commission's task was contained in a letter of 27 March 1616
from Ellesmere to Bacon. Id. at 121-22, 21 Eng. Rep. at 62. The question posed to Bacon was
in terms less neutral than those in the text above. The actual language read: "Whether the
Chancery may relieve B in this or such like cases, or else leave him utterly remediless and
undone" and "by what statute ... is the Chancery so restrained, and conscience and equity
banished, excluded and damned?" Id. at 122-23, 21 Eng. Rep. at 62.
276. Id. at 117-20, 21 Eng. Rep. at 61-62.

277. Id. at 118, 21 Eng. Rep. at 61. The report noted this had occurred "after judgments
in your Majesty's several Courts, the King's Bench, Common Pleas, Justice in Oyer, & C."
Id. at point 4.
278. Id. at 119, 21 Eng. Rep. at 62 (emphasis added). It was reported that in some cases
the defendants had attempted to demur and defend based upon their judgment at law, but
that this defense had been overruled. Id. at point 9.
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office [they] could not stay the judgments, except it be for some small
279
time, have directed the parties to seek relief in Chancery.

Bacon's commission found, then, that there had been a history of cases
where Chancery had issued injunctions to stay judgments at law, sometimes

for parties sent to Chancery by the judges for that very purpose, in situations
where the common law did not have a remedy available.
The more important question was whether any statutes prohibited Chancery from doing this. The commission focused on the statutes of Praemunire.uo The first of these, dating from 1353, penalized anyone who drew a
case out of the realm that belonged in the King's Court, or who sued in
any other court to defeat or impeach a judgment of the King's Court. The
second, dating from 1403, mandated that after a judgment was given in the

King's Court, the parties must be "in peace" unless the judgment was
reversed by Attaint or Error.
Bacon and his commission concluded that these statutes did not prevent
Chancery from acting after a judgment at law, which was not altogether
surprising since the commissioners were officers of the King, and Chancery
was one of the King's prerogative courts. Their report listed a number of
reasons why these statutes did not apply. 28 ' The commissioners concluded
that the 1353 statute 28 2 was intended to prohibit litigants from involving

foreign courts-most notably, the ecclesiastical courts of Rome-in matters
belonging in England's courts. 2 3 They added that no one had ever been
24
convicted under this statute for filing a bill in Chancery after a judgment.
28
The second statute of Praemunire
- was found not to restrain Chancery
because it was intended to relieve parties from having to answer matters

279. Id. at 119-20, 21 Eng. Rep. at 61-62. The commission stated that these precedents had
occurred not only when the Chancellor sat in Chancery, but also when various judges sat in
Chancery, in the vacancy or absence of the Chancellor. Id. at 120, 21 Eng. Rep. at 62, point
11. And it was added that a number of the bills filed in Chancery after judgments at law were
filed by reputable attorneys who had since become judges. Id. at 120, 21 Eng. Rep. at 62,
point 12.
280. 27 Edw. 3, ch. 1 (1353); 4 Hen. 4, ch. 23 (1403).
281. See generally The King's Order and Decree in Chancery, Cary 126-33, 21 Eng. Rep.
63-65 (1616). The report of the commission was drafted with a fine logic characterized by
closeness of reasoning and niceness of distinction.
282. 27 Edw. 3, ch. 1 (1353).
283. See I W. HoLDswoRm, supra note 27, at 462. The report also pointed out several
other difficulties in attempting to apply the 1353 statute to Chancery. The statute provided
that a person accused of this offense would be examined by the King, or his Council, or by
Chancery. Clearly, the commissioners said, Chancery could not both commit the offense and
be the judge of guilt. Also, the penalty for guilt-being put out of the King's protection-was
far too harsh for an excess of jurisdiction by one of the King's courts; it would be more
applicable to one who was using foreign courts, the commissioners believed. The King's Order
and Decree in Chancery, Cary 127-28, 21 Eng. Rep. 63-64.
284. The King's Order and Decree in Chancery, Cary 129, 21 Eng. Rep. 64. But there had
been two or three bills of indictment. Id.
285. 4 Hen. 4, ch. 23 (1403).
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"anew," that is, "again," after a judgment; Chancery, on the contrary,
examined matters of conscience and equity that had not been addressed by
the courts of law. 286 Therefore, the commissioners concluded, this statute,

too, was inapplicable.
Following these findings, King James entered an order approving and
ratifying the commissioners' report, including their account of existing precedents and their view that the statutes of Praemuniredid not bind Chancery.
He commanded that Chancery be available to provide equity to his subjects
where they were denied relief by the rigor and extremity of the law.2 The
King's order was very much in keeping with his views of the supremacy of
the crown. 28
In light of the precedents and statutes, were the commissioners' report

28 9
and the King's order correct? This appears to be susceptible of argument.
29
As has been noted earlier, 0 there is no doubt that Chancery had frequently
intervened in cases after judgment, occasionally at the suggestion of the

judges; 29' but the difficult question is whether the two statutes of Praemunire

applied to prevent Chancery from issuing injunctions of this sort.292 It seems

286. The King's Order and Decree in Chancery, Cary 131-32, 21 Eng. Rep. 64-65. The
commission also commented that the intent of this statute was to prevent an attack upon the
judgment. Chancery, the commission said, leaves the judgment in peace and only "meddles
with the corrupt conscience of the party." Id. at 132, 21 Eng. Rep. at 65.
287. Id. at 133-35, 21 Eng. Rep. at 65. The King's order was dated 18 July 1616.
288. See 3 W. BLACKSTONE, CoMMENTAREs * 54, who wrote of these actions of the King:
"[N]ot contented with the irrefragable rea[s]ons and precedents produced by his coun[s]el ... he
cho[s]e rather to decide the question by referring it to the plenitude of his royal prerogative."
See also F. MArrLAND, supra note 90, at 270. Maitland described this decision as giving the
King "the pleasure of deciding in favor of the Chancery, and thus maintaining his theory that
he was the supreme arbiter when his judges differed." Id.
In his order, James included his views on the supremacy of the King:
[Ilt appertaineth to our princely care and office only to judge over all our
Judges ... [and] to settle and decide as we in our princely wisdom shall find to
stand most with our honour, and the good example of our Royal Progenitors,
in the best times, and the general weal and good of our people, for which we
are to answer unto God, who hath placed us over them ....
The King's Order and Decree in Chancery, Cary 134-35, 21 Eng. Rep. 65 (emphasis added).
As noted, this decision has obvious political overtones. The fact that Coke was not in good
favor with the King has been cited as a factor in this incident. See J. BAKER, supra note 76,
at 93.
289. Yale, Introduction, supranote 140, at 11 n.3, commented that the statutes of Praemunire
"were, it seems, aimed at papal jurisdiction. But the legislation was worded widely enough to
permit of argument."
290. See supra notes 184-90 and accompanying text.
291. "[Ihe judges were not only concerned to direct litigants to seek relief in Chancery,
but even afforded positive approval to the application of injunctions against common law
proceedings both before and after verdict." W. JoNES, supra note 143, at 468.
292. See Earl of Oxford's Case, 1 Ch. Rep. 1, 21 Eng. Rep. 485 (1615) (discussed supra
note 259 and accompanying text); Arguments Proving From Antiquity the Dignity, Power, and
Jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery, 1 Ch. Rep., 21 Eng. Rep. 576 app. (n.d.). Both of
these sources strenuously maintained that the statutes of Praemunire did not extend to Chancery.

1986]

HISTORY OF INJUNCTIONS

fairly certain that the 1353 statute2 93 was intended to apply to ecclesiastical
courts and appeals to Rome, 294 not to Chancery. The second statute2 95 is not
as clear. The conclusion-by no means unanimous-of scholars seems to be
that it was not meant to include Chancery. Blackstone believed that "the
chief ju[s]tice [Coke] was clearly in the wrong." 296 Other scholars have agreed
with this assessment, that Coke and the common law lawyers were incorrect
in maintaining that an injunction after a judgment at law violated the statutes
of Praemunire.297 But one prominent writer has stated that "there was
authority tending to show that the statute applied to proceedings in the court
of Chancery.''295 Recently, one legal historian has strongly dissented from
the received opinion that Bacon's report and the King's order were correct,
and has insisted instead that Coke had the law on his side-that this use of
injunctions was illegal. 299 Notwithstanding these scholarly lucubrations, the
most probable conclusion is that these statutes did not encompass Chan3°
cery. 0

There is a general consensus that the resolution of this issue in favor of
Chancery was salutary. James' decision was "so obviously right," wrote
Holdsworth, because it kept intact a system of equity that greatly benefited
litigants. 30 ' Another noted legal historian commented that "[tihe victory of
Chancery was final and complete-and if we were to have a court of equity
at all, it was a necessary victory. ' 302 The defects and omissions, procedural
and substantive, in the common law required a supplementing system of
equity, one that could stay judgments that were wrongfully obtained. The
King's order established that Chancery would have this power. But if Chancery and common law were to coexist, this power would have to be used
with restraint.

293. 27 Edw. 3, ch. 1 (1353).
294. 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 27, at 462.
295. 4 Hen. 4, ch. 23 (1403).
296. 3 W. BLrcKsTotN,

supra note 288, at 54.

297. See, for example, J. POMEROY, supra note 149, § 1360, at 2700, who said that in this
dispute, "the reasons urged by the common-law judges were frivolous."
298. 1 W. HoLDswoRTH, supra note 27, at 462 (citing C. ST. GERMAIN, DOCTOR AND STUDENT,
bk. , c.18 (c. 1532); Treatise on the Subpoena, in HARGRAVE's LAW TRACTS 348 (1786); Beck
v. Hesill (Hen. VI) Cal. ii xii); see also D. KRn.y, supra note 11, at 43 ("There seems little
doubt that the statute was taken to bind the Chancellor . .
").
299. J. BAER, supra note 76, at 92-93. Baker argued that "[t]he procedure was an irregular

appeal, an illegal challenge to judgments given notionally before the king himself." Id. at 92.
He added, "[o]nce the dust had settled, the 1616 decree would be seen as illegal .

. . ." Id.

at

93 (citing King v. Standish, 1 Lev. 241, 83 Eng. Rep. 387 (1670)); see also Baker, The Dark
Age of Legal History 1500-1700, in LEGAL HISToRY STmDims 1972, at I (D. Jenkins ed. 1975).
300. See supra note 283. It also appears to be significant that these statutes could very easily
have listed Chancery as included within their ambit, but they did not do so.
301. 5 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 27, at 237.
302. F. MAITLAND, supra note 90, at 270.
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1616-Tow.D STABILITY

Common Law Recalcitrance

The supporters of the common law were loath to accept the King's order
in 1616 as final, and on occasion throughout the seventeenth century made
attempts to reopen the issue. Coke remained defiant; in writing his Institutes
he still maintained that injunctions after judgments were contrary to the
statutes. 3°3 But injunctions-and Chancery-survived the calamitous seventeenth century in England despite the political upheavals and the continued
hostility of some common law lawyers and judges.3°4
There were decisions in the courts of law which reflected this disagreement
with the King's decision. An Exchequer decision in 1655, Morel v. Douglas0°
appears to have said that the second statute of Praemunire,3 "6 applied to the
courts of equity. This decision cited Throckmorton v. Finch,1°7 but ignored
the report of Bacon's commission and the King's order of 1616. There was
a case in King's Bench in 1670, King v. Standish,3"' where, after the plaintiff
secured a judgment, the defendant obtained an injunction from Chancery.
The plaintiff then sought to indict defendant on the first statute of Praemunire.3 9 King's Bench did not simply follow the King's order of 1616 and
dismiss the suit; it listened to arguments on the issue. 10 The King's order
was cited but apparently was not, to this court, dispositive of the question.
The case remained pending. When it was taken up again, Sir Matthew Hale
was Chief Justice of King's Bench. He believed that the case was not within
the statute and no further action was taken. These two cases indicate the
lingering opposition to the King's order. But they were, Holdsworth said,

303. 3 E. COKE, supra note 209, at ch. 54.
304. See W. HoLDswoRTH, supra note 269, at 101. Holdsworth wrote that:
[lit is true that the existence of equity was threatened when the outbreak of the
Great Rebellion destroyed the constitution. But the decision of James was so
obviously right; the need for a court of equity was so clear; the fact that the
courts of common law and equity had, down to the outbreak of the Great
Rebellion, worked well together to the advantage both of the litigant and the law
was so evident-that even under the commonwealth it was impossible to dispense
wholly with equity. At the Restoration it silently resumed the place which had
been given to it by James I's decree.
Id.
305. Hardres 23, 145 Eng. Rep. 360 (Ex. 1655).
306. 4 Hen. 4, ch. 23 (1403).
307. 4 E. CoKE, supra note 209, at 86. See supra note 254 and accompanying text.
308. 1 Lev. 241, 83 Eng. Rep. 387 (K.B. 1670).
309. 27 Edw. 3, ch. 1 (1353).
310. 1 Lev. at 241, 83 Eng. Rep. at 388.
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merely of "academic interest," 3 ' and were not controlling, since Chancery
2
continued to enjoin parties from enforcing judgmentsA'

B.

Equity Becomes Settled

After 1616, there were gradual changes in both common law and Chancery

that affected injunctions. There were improvements in the common law
system that made injunctions less necessary and less frequent.313 Chancery
was also changing: there was a growing practice of citing cases-a practice
which was "helping, not only to settle still more exactly the true sphere of

the court's jurisdiction, but also to make some fixed rules for the exercise
of the chancellor's discretion. ' 31 4 But it should be recognized that although
rules were developing, the Chancellor was still largely free to do substantial
justice. 31s The general movement, however, was toward a settled system of

rules that supplemented the common law. One scholar has remarked that,
during the first half of the seventeenth century:
[A]Ithough we can see the origins of some of our later equitable rules,
they are, as yet, very rudimentary. We must wait till the latter half of
the seventeenth century for marked progress in this process of transformation. It is not till then that the lineaments of our modem system of
equity begin to emerge with any distinctness.316
The development of rules continued, and by Nottingham's tenure in Chancery
317
(1673-1682), equity seems to have become an ordered system of principles.

311. As Holdsworth explained: "The objections [to the King's order] which some few common
lawyers continued to raise right up to the end of the seventeenth century have merely an
academic interest." W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 269, at 101.
312. Parliament, too, remained discontented with Chancery after 1616. See generally 1 W.
HowswoRmT, supra note 27, at 463-64. Parliament was not simply concerned about Chancery's
injunctions; it was still not reconciled to Chancery's jurisdiction. See supra notes 127-30 and
accompanying text. In 1676-1677, the House of Commons adopted a resolution that Chancery
should not have jurisdiction over cases determinable at common law. In 1690, a bill introduced
in the House of Lords would have given the courts of law power to issue writs of prohibition
if Chancery encroached on the common law jurisdiction. The bill was later dropped. I W.
HoLDswoRTH, supra note 27, at 464; see also Yale, Introduction,supra note 140, at 73 ("There
was recurrent agitation in Parliament sponsored by the more recalcitrant of the common lawyers
against the equitable jurisdiction, but it never developed into a serious conflict of jurisdictions.").
313. Yale, Introduction, supra note 140, at 70; see also D. KEIRY, supra note 11, at 166.
314. 5 W. HoLDswoRT, supra note 27, at 337.
315. Id.
316. Id. at 218. See also T. PLUCKNmTT, supra note 2, at 692, who agreed that it was in the
second half of the seventeenth century, after 1660 actually, that equity developed something
of a definite body of rules, and discretion largely disappeared.
317. F. MArLAND, supra note 90, at 312.
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C. Injunctions and Chancellors Bacon and Nottingham
Although there were fewer injunction cases in the 1600's due to improvements in the common law, injunctions were still issued. 318 But they were no
longer a serious strain on the relations between courts of law and Chancery.
The improvement of relations after 1616 was due in part to the appointment
as Chancellor of men who were common law lawyers and who were willing
to cooperate with the judges.319 The improvement was also due to ameliorations of injunctive procedures: "Generally it was the regular use of the
injunction which chiefly contributed to the settlement [of relations], just as
its earlier use had contributed to the conflict between Coke and Ellesmere. ' 320
Seventeenth century Chancellors, especially Francis Bacon and Lord Nottingham, made conspicuous and successful attempts to regulate and moderate
Chancery's use of the injunction.
1. Francis Bacon
Francis Bacon 321 (Chancellor, 1617-1621) was named to the Chancery immediately following Ellesmere. Although Chancellor but a short time, he
accomplished much. He began the practice of using cases as precedents in
Chancery, to help establish consistency in decisions. 322 He also cooperated
324
with the courts of law, 323 and thus helped to restore harmonious relations.
Valuable as these accomplishments were, they were not his most enduring
contribution to Chancery. He created a code of procedure for Chancery

318.
319.
320.
321.

See generally Yale, Introduction, supra note 140.
Id. at 69-70; see also supra note 210 and accompanying text.
Yale, Introduction, supra note 140, at 70.
He was formerly Attorney General and head of the King's commission in 1616. See F.
ANDERSON, F.ANcis BACON: His CAREER AND His THouGHT (1962).
322. T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 2, at 690.
323. Id.
324. 5 W. HOLDSWORTm, supra note 27, at 254. Holdsworth described Bacon's efforts to
restore cordial relations with the judges as follows:
No doubt the victory of the Chancery [in 1616], to which he largely contributed,
had left the common lawyers rather sore. In the speech which he made on taking
his seat in Chancery he promised that the issue of injunctions should be carefully
regulated; and further, he imitated the example of Sir Thomas More, and invited
the judges to dinner to discuss the matter. After dinner, he pointed out that the
late controversy had been largely personal; that for the future, 'as I would not
suffer any the least diminution or derogation from the ancient and due power of
the Chancery, so if anything should be brought to them at any time touching the
proceedings of the Chancery which did seem to them exorbitant or inordinate,
that they should freely and friendly acquaint me with it, and we should soon
agree; or if not, we had a master that could easily both discern and rule.' At
which he says 'I did see cheer and comfort in their faces, as if it were a new
world.'
Id. at 251 (citing 6 J.SPEDDING, LwE AND LmTraas OF FRANcis BACON 198 (1880)).
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which remained largely in place until the 1800's;325 it enabled 3Chancery
to
principles of equity. 26

more easily formulate consistent rules and
Bacon's code of procedure consisted of approximately 100 Procedural
Orders that he issued in 1619 and 1620.327 These Orders, or Ordinances, as
they came to be called, covered virtually every subject; injunctions were
dealt with in Orders 20 through 28. 328 These deserve examination because,
by these Orders, Bacon curtailed the abuse of the Chancery's injunctive
powers.3 29 Orders 20 through 28 dealt mainly with injunctions staying suits
at law and injunctions for possession -33
Order 21 prohibited injunctions to stay suits at law solely on priority of
filing, or solely on "surmise of the plaintiff's bill"; rather, there must have
been some grounds for the injunction revealed in the defendant's answer,

"
or in a record, or in plain writing.33
' This important order appears to have
been designed to prevent a party from obtaining an injunction ex parte,
merely by filing a bill in Chancery. As a result, the defendant would usually
have an opportunity to answer in Chancery before his suit at law was
enjoined. This order also prohibited the granting of injunctions on priority
32
of suit only.
Order 22 specified that when a plaintiff was seeking to obtain an injunction
to stay a defendant's suit at law, if the defendant did not answer or appear
in Chancery, an injunction might issue. But once the defendant answered,

325. W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 155, at 193.
326. Holdsworth stated: "The formation of such a code of procedure was a condition
precedent to the development of a system of equity." Id.
327. See 5 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 27, at 253. These Orders can be found at 15 WoRKs
OF FRANcis BACON 347-72 (J. Spedding ed. 1861) [hereinafter cited as WoRKs OF BACON].
328. Wosus OF BACON, supra note 327, at 355-57.
329. 5 W. HoLswoRTa, supra note 27, at 251-52. A further illustration of Bacon's concern
about the abuse of injunctions is contained in his speech given when he became Chancellor.
Bacon in his speech on taking office describes graphically the facts of such a case
where the bill only contained the following words: 'My Lord, the bill [in Chancery]
came in on Monday, and the arrest at common law was on Tuesday: I pray the
injunction upon priority of suit.' He did not, he said, intend to grant relief to
the man with the fastest horse, and he abolished the practice by his twenty-first
ordinance.
Yale, Introduction, supra note 140, at 70-71.
330. Two Orders, 20 and 28, did not deal with these two topics. Order 20 concerned private
petitions: "No injunction of any nature shall be granted, revived, dissolved, or stayed upon
any private petition." WoRs OF BACON, supra note 327, at 355. Order 28 joncerned waste.
It permitted injunctions to restrain waste-such as felling timber or plowing up ancient pasturebut did not allow them where the defendant claimed an estate of inheritance. Id. at 357.
331. Id. at 356. This Order also specified that an injunction could be obtained to stay a suit
at law if the defendant was in contempt for not answering, or if the debt that was being sued
upon at law was old and "hath slept long," or if the debtor or creditor had died some time
before suit was brought. Id.
332. See Yale, Introduction, supra note 140, at 70, who says that the practice of granting
injunctions based on priority of suit seems to have flourished near the end of the sixteenth
century. See also supra note 329.
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unless the plaintiff moved to continue the injunction, it would automatically
be dissolved.333 This Order, then, allowed an injunction whose purpose was
to persuade the defendant to answer, but prevented its being abused by
continuing longer than was necessary.
Sometimes a party would secure an injunction to stay a suit at law while
an equitable point was litigated in Chancery. Order 24 sought to prevent
this party from unduly delaying the proceedings in Chancery. Order 24
stated: "Where an injunction hath been obtained for staying of suits, and
no prosecution is had for the space of three terms, the injunction is to fall
334
of itself without farther motion.
Order 25 said that a party could not obtain an injunction to stay a suit
at law on a debt until he deposited in Chancery a sum of money equal to
the debt. This was not required, however, if it was quite plain that the debt
should be discharged in equity.335 This rule was intended to discourage parties
from seeking injunctions simply to avoid paying back the money.
Injunctions for possession of land were the subject of Order 26. 336 It stated
that an injunction for possession could not be obtained before Chancery
had heard the case and entered a decree, unless the party had been in
possession with title for three years before the bill was filed. This excluded
purchasers who did not have possession, or those who, in a dispute, had
recently taken possession of the property; they could not obtain an immediate
injunction for possession, but had to wait until the Chancellor heard the
37
matter.
The thrust of Chancellor Bacon's Orders was that injunctions should
henceforth be granted with more circumspection and fairness. These Orders
made it difficult to obtain an injunction without requiring the plaintiff to
demonstrate why an injunction was merited, and without allowing the defendant an opportunity to respond. Bacon's efforts proved successful: "In his
orders he provided against the abuse by litigants of the power to get injunctions; and it is clear that his measures succeeded, since the courts of
common law and Chancery ceased to quarrel. 3 a38 Bacon's Orders provided
an additional benefit: by subjecting injunctions to clear procedural rules,
they permitted equitable principles to begin to develop in an orderly, systematic fashion.

333. WoRKs oF BACoN, supra note 327, at 356.
334. Id. at 356-57.
335. Id. at 357.
336. Id.
337. Order 27 qualified this by allowing injunctions for possession if the defendant was in
contempt and could not be found, or if he absented himself for a year. Id.
338. W. HoLDswoRrH, supra note 269, at 106-07.
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2. Lord Nottingham
By Lord Nottingham's time (Chancellor, 1673-1682)," 39 the rules concerning
injunctions were fairly well settled. One scholar has written about injunctive
practice that "generally the practice was by the later part of the seventeenth
century regular and predictable ...

.30 Upon being appointed to the Chan-

cery in 1673, Nottingham began to compile, for his personal use, a manual
of practice in Chancery.3 41 The section in this manual on injunctions delineates injunctive rules and procedures in 1673-1674.42 The provisions in this
manual concerning injunctions focused on several central ideas. There were
provisions to prevent injunctions from being used for delay, provisions to
assure that injunctive procedures treat both parties fairly, and provisions to
keep injunctions from unnecessarily interfering with suits at law. This manual
also revealed that injunctions were beginning to be used for discovery purposes.
Nottingham, at several places in his manual, insisted that injunctions
should not be used as instruments of delay. At one point, concerning injunctions for possession, he stated that the injunction would be dissolved if
43
the plaintiff delayed the hearing.
At another point, Nottingham declared:
If he who hath obtained an injunction to stay a suit at law shall not
prosecute his cause to a hearing as fast as by the rules of the Court he
may, the injunction shall be dissolved, for no man who hath got an
injunction to delay his adversary must be allowed to rest or sleep upon
it.3"

Elsewhere, the manual specified that one who had obtained an injunction
to stay a suit at law could not take exceptions to the answer filed in Chancery,
3 45
"for this is too notorious a ground for delay.''

339. Nottingham was Lord Keeper, 1673-1675, and Lord Chancellor, 1675-1682. See T.
PLUCKNETT, supra note 2, at 702-03.
340. Yale, Introduction, supra note 140, at 72.
341. See generally LORD NoTTINcmA's 'MANUAL OF CHANCERY PRACTICE,' supra note 140.
This manual was not published at the time; it was for Nottingham's personal use. Yale described
the sources for this "Manual of Chancery Practice" as follows: "Much of Lord Nottingham's
text is drawn from three sets of General Orders, namely those of Bacon in 1619, the Commissioners of the Great Seal in 1649, and Clarendon in 1661." Yale, Introduction, supra note
140, at 5.
342. LORD NoTINoHAM's 'MANUAL OF CHANCERY PRACTICE,' supra note 140, tit. XII, at

142-48.
343. Id. tit.
XII, 7, at 144.
344. Id. 16, at 147.
345. Id. 17. Another point concerning delay stated that if an injunction had been granted
"till answer and further order," it would be dissolved automatically within 14 days after the
answer was filed. Id. 5, at 144. This is similar to Bacon's Order 22, discussed supra note
333 and accompanying text.
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In addition to insisting on avoiding delay, Nottingham's manual also
emphasized that injunctive procedures should be fair. For example, one
point warned that an attorney who misleads the Chancellor by reading only
part of the opponent's answer "shall justly incur the displeasure of the
court." 3 Another point stated that no person's possession of property shall
be removed by an injunction before a hearing, 47 thus giving the possessor
an opportunity to argue his position to the Chancellor before being dispossessed. These reflected the goal of following procedures that treat both parties
fairly and equally.
Some provisions in Nottingham's manual tended to promote conciliation
with the courts of law. One declared: "Injunctions to quiet possession must
-348
not hinder the defendant's proceedings at law to evict plaintiff ....
Another expressed a solicitude for the courts of law which would have been
inconceivable in the days of Coke and Ellesmere: "Upon all motions for
injunctions to stay suits at law, the Court [Chancery] is to be informed how
far the suit hath proceeded and of the precise time of the trial, if it not be
'349
past, that so no trial may be unnecessarily stayed.
There is also a new concept in Nottingham's manual: that of using Chancery proceedings and injunctions to obtain discovery for a suit at law. One
point in the manual stated that taking exceptions to an answer in Chancery
was not sufficient grounds for granting or continuing an injunction, "unless
it appears to the Court [Chancery] that the answer is insufficient in such a
point as might be evidence at law if it were well answered, and is necessary
to the plaintiff's defence at law. ' 35 0 Nottingham was obviously aware that
such an injunction was being used to help the plaintiff obtain information
needed to defend the suit at law. Another point reflected this idea, saying
that if the trial in the suit at law were scheduled too soon for the plaintiff
to receive defendant's answer to plaintiff's bill in Chancery, which was
expected to contain information necessary to plaintiff's defense at law,
"Chancery may stay by injunction not only the suits but the trials themselves .... "31,

346. LoRD NOTTINGHAM'S 'MANUAL OF CHANCERY PRACTICE,' supra note 140, tit. XII,

3,

at 143.
347. Id. 9, at 144. This point is similar to Bacon's Order 26. See supra note 336 and
accompanying text. Nottingham's manual contained another point relating to the concept of
fairness. It stated that when an injunction to stay a suit at law is issued, it must be served on
the adverse party within four days. Nottingham noted the reason for this: "For it is mischievous
to keep such order and serve them just before the trial, whereas if they had been served sooner,
the adverse party might have moved against it." LoRo NorTTI

supra note 140, tit. XII,
was granted ex parte.

PRACTICE,'

AM's 'MANUAL OF CHANCERY

20, at 148. This obviously refers to an injunction that

348. LoRD NorrinoiMlH's 'MANUAL Or CHANCERY PRACTICE,' supra note

at 144.
349. Id. 18, at 147.
350. Id. 12, at 146.
351. Id. 13.

140,

tit. XII,

8,
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Nottingham's unpublished manual, while of great interest to posterity, did
less to direct the path of equity than Nottingham's decisions as Chancellor.
Through his decisions, he provided a clear statement of the bounds of
equitable jurisdiction35 2 by helping to mold the scattered and disparate eq35 3
uitable concepts and notions into more definite and precise principles.
Equity became a settled system-a system of principles, precedents, and
reported decisions. With Nottingham clarifying the extent of Chancery's
3 54
jurisdiction, relations with the common law courts continued to improve.
The transformation of equitable concepts into more definite rules included
the development of specific rules for the issuing of injunctions. The use of
injunctions had become more restrained, more stable and settled, and consequently was no longer a source of friction between the common law courts
and Chancery.
CONCLUSION

This article is not, of course, a complete history of the injunction; no
single essay could seriously purport to be. Rather, this article has attempted
to present some of the historical features of the injunction before 1700. It
began by examining some possible ancestors or forerunners of the injunction:
the Praetor's Interdict of ancient Rome; the royal orders or writs in early
English law; and common law writs of an equitable nature, especially the
writ of prohibition. The courts of law used these common law writs in a
manner very similar to that of the Chancellors' equitable remedies. When

the common law became less flexible and less equitable, Chancery began to
receive petitions from unsatisfied suitors. Chancery soon became a judicial
body with the Chancellor administering justice by issuing in personam orders.
Chancellors used injunctions for a number of purposes: to prevent threatened
harms; to allow certain equitable concepts, such as fraud and duress, to
come into the law; and, most conspicuously, to restrain inequitable common
law proceedings or judgments. It was this last use that aroused the enmity
of the common law judges and resulted in the dispute that was eventually
decided by King James' oider in 1616, sanctioning Chancery's use of the
injunction. After this order, the Chancellors slowly began to establish equity

352. Yale, Introduction, supra note 140, at 74.

353. See W.

HOLDSWORTH,

supra note 155, at 194. See also W.

HOLDSWORTH,

supra note

269, at 148, where Holdsworth noted that Nottingham's decisions "were beginning to settle

the doctrines of equity." See also id. at 150, where Nottingham was compared to Ellesmere
and Bacon: "His work was different from, yet a continuation of, theirs. They had organized
and systematized the court of Chancery, its practice, and its procedure. He began the work of
organizing and systematizing the principles upon which the court acted; and, as a result of his
work, equity began to assume its final form." Holdsworth concluded that Nottingham deserves
his title as "the Father of Modern Equity." Id.
354. See Yale, Introduction, supra note 140, at 74.

INDIANA LA W JOURNAL

[Vol. 61:539

as a stable system of precedents and principles, including injunctive principles. This stabilization, which was largely accomplished by the end of
Nottingham's tenure in Chancery, is an appropriate point on which to
conclude this article.
The injunction-the personal order from the Chancellor directing a party
to do or to refrain from doing a certain act-was perhaps the most significant
equitable remedy. The development of the injunction was, like the development of Chancery itself, due to the defects and omissions of the common
law. If the common law did not provide a remedy where one was needed,
Chancery frequently would. 55 The injunction not only afforded an indispensable remedy, it also stimulated the common law system to improve, and
to recognize concepts such as fraud, in an attempt to win back some of the
business and power accruing to Chancery.
The use of the injunction had, however, a less beneficial effect: friction
between the courts of law and Chancery caused when Chancery restrained
proceedings and judgments at law. This friction cannot be blamed solely on
the injunction. There is, however, no doubt that the injunction aggravated
the dispute, since it was the means by which Chancery directly interfered
with proceedings at law. But there were, in fact, judgments which were
obtained by fraud and other inequitable means, and if some Chancellorssuch as Wolsey and Ellesmere-abused the injunction, others-such as Moreseem to have used it scrupulously and justly.
The injunction, therefore, played a major role in the Chancellor's efforts
to administer a system of equity to supplement the law. The victory (if it
may be called such) of Chancery in the long conflict over the use of the
injunction was, perhaps, necessary if the Chancellors were to have the power
to supply equity where the common law lacked it.

355. This is not to paint the picture in black and white, to make the common law sound
ineffective and Chancery exemplary. Chancery would, all too soon, be plagued with egregious
problems:
It is the height of irony that the court which originated to provide an escape
from the defects of common law procedure should in its later history have
developed procedural defects worse by far than those of the law. For two centuries
before Dickens wrote Bleak House, the word 'Chancery' had been synonymous with
expense, delay and despair.
J. BAER, supra note 76, at 95. One may, however, be permitted a certain degree of skepticism
about Baker's figure of two centuries.

